31 resultados para false beliefs
Resumo:
This study was carried out with new lecturers on a two year Post Graduate Certificate in Learning and Teaching in Higher Education programme in a UK university. The aim was to establish their beliefs about how studying on the programme aligned with their teaching and learning philosophy and what, if anything, had changed or constrained those beliefs. Ten lecturers took part in an in-depth semi-structured interview. Content analysis of the transcripts suggested positive reactions to the programme but lecturers’ new insights were sometimes constrained by departments and university bureaucracy, particularly in the area of assessment. The conflicting roles of research and teaching were also a major issue facing these new professionals.
Resumo:
Recent research findings have illustrated that false memories induced in the laboratory can be dissociated from the beliefs that the events had in fact occurred. In this study we assessed whether this dissociability is a quality peculiar to false memory, or whether it represents a general characteristic of autobiographical memory. To this end we examined whether people can be induced to stop believing in memories for true experiences. Participants observed and performed simple actions, and were later falsely informed that they had not performed some of them-that false memories for these actions had been implanted through the use of fabricated evidence. Before and after receiving this misinformation, participants rated their belief in and memory of performing those actions, other actions that they had also performed, and actions that they had not performed. Whereas the misinformation substantially undermined participants' beliefs in the specific performed actions about which they had been misinformed, it had little effect on their endorsement of remembering those actions. The misinformation thus boosted the proportion of occasions in which participants rated their memories as stronger than their beliefs, and it weakened the correlation between belief and memory ratings. Thus, this study provides the first experimental demonstration of non-believed memories of true experiences. We discuss our findings with reference to the small literature concerning the use of socially-communicated misinformation to undermine event memories, and with reference to the structure of autobiographical memory. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
Resumo:
We report an extension of the procedure devised by Weinstein and Shanks (Memory & Cognition 36:1415-1428, 2008) to study false recognition and priming of pictures. Participants viewed scenes with multiple embedded objects (seen items), then studied the names of these objects and the names of other objects (read items). Finally, participants completed a combined direct (recognition) and indirect (identification) memory test that included seen items, read items, and new items. In the direct test, participants recognized pictures of seen and read items more often than new pictures. In the indirect test, participants' speed at identifying those same pictures was improved for pictures that they had actually studied, and also for falsely recognized pictures whose names they had read. These data provide new evidence that a false-memory induction procedure can elicit memory-like representations that are difficult to distinguish from "true" memories of studied pictures. © 2012 Psychonomic Society, Inc.
Resumo:
A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants' beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event's occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be independently-occurring constructs. © 2012 Clark et al.
Resumo:
When people receive descriptions or doctored photos of events that never happened, they often come to remember those events. But if people receive both a description and a doctored photo, does the order in which they receive the information matter? We asked people to consider a description and a doctored photograph of a childhood hot air balloon ride, and we varied which medium they saw first. People who saw a description first reported more false images and memories than did people who saw a photo first, a result that fits with an anchoring account of false childhood memories. © 2010 The Psychonomic Society, Inc.
Resumo:
More powerful computers and affordable digital-video equipment means that desktop-video editing is now accessible and popular. In two experiments, we investigated whether seeing fake-video evidence, or simply being told that video evidence exists, could lead people to believe they committed an act they never did. Subjects completed a computerized gambling task, and when they returned later the same day, we falsely accused them of cheating on the task. All of the subjects were told that incriminating video evidence existed, and half were also exposed to a fake video. See-video subjects were more likely to confess without resistance, and to internalize the act than told-video subjects, and see-video subjects tended to confabulate details more often than told-video subjects. We offer a metacognitive-based account of our results. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Resumo:
Background: Adherence to treatment is often reported to be low in children with cystic fibrosis. Adherence in cystic fibrosis is an important research area and more research is needed to better understand family barriers to adherence in order for clinicians to provide appropriate intervention. The aim of this study was to evaluate adherence to enzyme supplements, vitamins and chest physiotherapy in children with cystic fibrosis and to determine if any modifiable risk factors are associated with adherence. Methods: A sample of 100 children (≤18 years) with cystic fibrosis (44 male; median [range] 10.1 [0.2-18.6] years) and their parents were recruited to the study from the Northern Ireland Paediatric Cystic Fibrosis Centre. Adherence to enzyme supplements, vitamins and chest physiotherapy was assessed using a multi-method approach including; Medication Adherence Report Scale, pharmacy prescription refill data and general practitioner prescription issue data. Beliefs about treatments were assessed using refined versions of the Beliefs about Medicines Questionnaire-specific. Parental depressive symptoms were assessed using the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. Results: Using the multi-method approach 72% of children were classified as low-adherers to enzyme supplements, 59% low-adherers to vitamins and 49% low-adherers to chest physiotherapy. Variations in adherence were observed between measurement methods, treatments and respondents. Parental necessity beliefs and child age were significant independent predictors of child adherence to enzyme supplements and chest physiotherapy, but parental depressive symptoms were not found to be predictive of adherence. Conclusions: Child age and parental beliefs about treatments should be taken into account by clinicians when addressing adherence at routine clinic appointments. Low adherence is more likely to occur in older children, whereas, better adherence to cystic fibrosis therapies is more likely in children whose parents strongly believe the treatments are necessary. The necessity of treatments should be reinforced regularly to both parents and children.
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As the Semantic Web is an open, complex and constantly evolving medium, it is the norm, but not exception that information at different sites is incomplete or inconsistent. This poses challenges for the engineering and development of agent systems on the Semantic Web, since autonomous software agents need to understand, process and aggregate this information. Ontology language OWL provides core language constructs to semantically markup resources on the Semantic Web, on which software agents interact and cooperate to accomplish complex tasks. However, as OWL was designed on top of (a subset of) classic predicate logic, it lacks the ability to reason about inconsistent or incomplete information. Belief-augmented Frames (BAF) is a frame-based logic system that associates with each frame a supporting and a refuting belief value. In this paper, we propose a new ontology language Belief-augmented OWL (BOWL) by integrating OWL DL and BAF to incorporate the notion of confidence. BOWL is paraconsistent, hence it can perform useful reasoning services in the presence of inconsistencies and incompleteness. We define the abstract syntax and semantics of BOWL by extending those of OWL. We have proposed reasoning algorithms for various reasoning tasks in the BOWL framework and we have implemented the algorithms using the constraint logic programming framework. One example in the sensor fusion domain is presented to demonstrate the application of BOWL.
Resumo:
Objective: Images on food and dietary supplement packaging might lead people to infer (appropriately or inappropriately) certain health benefits of those products. Research on this issue largely involves direct questions, which could (a) elicit inferences that would not be made unprompted, and (b) fail to capture inferences made implicitly. Using a novel memory-based method, in the present research, we explored whether packaging imagery elicits health inferences without prompting, and the extent to which these inferences are made implicitly. Method: In 3 experiments, participants saw fictional product packages accompanied by written claims. Some packages contained an image that implied a health-related function (e.g., a brain), and some contained no image. Participants studied these packages and claims, and subsequently their memory for seen and unseen claims were tested. Results: When a health image was featured on a package, participants often subsequently recognized health claims that—despite being implied by the image—were not truly presented. In Experiment 2, these recognition errors persisted despite an explicit warning against treating the images as informative. In Experiment 3, these findings were replicated in a large consumer sample from 5 European countries, and with a cued-recall test. Conclusion: These findings confirm that images can act as health claims, by leading people to infer health benefits without prompting. These inferences appear often to be implicit, and could therefore be highly pervasive. The data underscore the importance of regulating imagery on product packaging; memory-based methods represent innovative ways to measure how leading (or misleading) specific images can be. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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When required to represent a perspective that conflicts with one's own, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) suggests that the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rvlPFC) supports the inhibition of that conflicting self-perspective. The present task dissociated inhibition of self-perspective from other executive control processes by contrasting belief reasoning-a cognitive state where the presence of conflicting perspectives was manipulated-with a conative desire state wherein no systematic conflict existed. Linear modeling was used to examine the effect of continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) to rvlPFC on participants' reaction times in belief and desire reasoning. It was anticipated that cTBS applied to rvlPFC would affect belief but not desire reasoning, by modulating activity in the Ventral Attention System (VAS). We further anticipated that this effect would be mediated by functional connectivity within this network, which was identified using resting state fMRI and an unbiased model-free approach. Simple reaction-time analysis failed to detect an effect of cTBS. However, by additionally modeling individual measures from within the stimulated network, the hypothesized effect of cTBS to belief (but, importantly, not desire) reasoning was demonstrated. Structural morphology within the stimulated region, rvlPFC, and right temporoparietal junction were demonstrated to underlie this effect. These data provide evidence that inconsistencies found with cTBS can be mediated by the composition of the functional network that is being stimulated. We suggest that the common claim that this network constitutes the VAS explains the effect of cTBS to this network on false belief reasoning. Hum Brain Mapp, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Resumo:
Belief-desire reasoning is a core component of 'Theory of Mind' (ToM), which can be used to explain and predict the behaviour of agents. Neuroimaging studies reliably identify a network of brain regions comprising a 'standard' network for ToM, including temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex. Whilst considerable experimental evidence suggests that executive control (EC) may support a functioning ToM, co-ordination of neural systems for ToM and EC is poorly understood. We report here use of a novel task in which psychologically relevant ToM parameters (true versus false belief; approach versus avoidance desire) were manipulated orthogonally. The valence of these parameters not only modulated brain activity in the 'standard' ToM network but also in EC regions. Varying the valence of both beliefs and desires recruits anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting a shared inhibitory component associated with negatively valenced mental state concepts. Varying the valence of beliefs additionally draws on ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, reflecting the need to inhibit self perspective. These data provide the first evidence that separate functional and neural systems for EC may be recruited in the service of different aspects of ToM.
Resumo:
Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an “upper bound” on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.
Resumo:
Researchers have proposed that planting false memories could have positive behavioral consequences. The idea of deceptively planting “beneficial” false memories outside of the laboratory raises important ethical questions, but how might the general public appraise this moral dilemma? In two studies, participants from the USA and UK read about a fictional “false-memory therapy” that led people to adopt healthy behaviors. Participants then reported their attitudes toward the acceptability of this therapy, via scale-rating (both studies) and open-text (Study 2) responses. The data revealed highly divergent responses to this contentious issue, ranging from abject horror to unqualified enthusiasm. Moreover, the responses shed light on conditions that participants believed would make the therapy less or more ethical. Whether or not deceptively planting memories outside the lab could ever be justifiable, these studies add valuable evidence to scientific and societal debates on neuroethics, whose relevance to memory science is increasingly acute.
Resumo:
The importance of hope has long been asserted in the field of conflict resolution. However, little is actually known about either how to induce hope or what effects hope has on conciliatory attitudes. In the current research, we tested whether (1) hope is based upon beliefs regarding conflict malleability and (2) hope predicts support for concessions for peace. Study 1, a correlational study conducted among Israeli Jews, revealed that malleability beliefs regarding conflicts in general are associated with hope regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as well as with support for concessions. In Study 2, we established causality using an experimental manipulation of beliefs regarding conflicts being malleable (vs. fixed). Findings have both theoretical and practical implications regarding inducing hope in intractable conflicts, thus promoting the attitudes so critical for peacemaking.