Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. We document het- erogeneous responses to these two types of shocks. While households with large holdings of secu- rities from stressed Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) decrease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Eurozone crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Eurozone countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level (caused by bank distress) result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. We also show that only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration, while shocks in retail credit are inconsequential. Our results are robust to falsification tests, propensity score matching techniques, and instrumental variables estimation.

Dividend increases and initiations and default risk in equity returns

This study extends the Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) analysis by incorporating default risk. Using data for firms that either increased or initiated cash dividend payments during the 23-year period 1986-2008, we find reduction in default risk. This reduction is shown to be a priced risk factor beyond the Fama and French (1993) risk measures, and it explains the dividend payment decision and the positive market reaction around dividend increases and initiations. Further analysis reveals that the reduction in default risk is a significant factor in explaining the 3-year excess returns following dividend increases and initiations. © Copyright Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2011.

Credit rating agency regulation after the UK's EU membership referendum

Assesses the implications of the UK's decision to withdraw from the EU for the regulation of its credit rating industry. Discusses the current rules of the Credit Rating Agencies Regulations 2010. Considers how the likelihood that a "post-Brexit" UK will be increasingly dependent on its financial services sector might affect the approach taken towards its regulation.

The universal credit rating group:the viability of a response

The role played by the Big Three credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) in the creation of the recent Financial Crisis has been well documented, as too has their conduct in the aftermath of the Crisis where they contributed to the prolonging of the effects of the systemic breakdown. Also, with a string of record fines and cease-and-desist orders in the wake of the Crisis lending weight to the notion that the Big Three have no plans of performing any more ethically, there are a number of organisations that are endeavouring to provide a better alternative to the stranglehold of the Big Three. In the first instalment of the Viability of a Response series we were introduced to the International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency who, through the amalgamation of forward-looking and non-profit ideals, intends to inject some much needed ethical consideration into the process of providing ratings that are crucial to the marketplace . In this edition of the series, we will be introduced to the Universal Credit Rating Group (UCRG) which is an alliance between Dagong Global Ratings, RusRating, and Egan-Jones Rating Company. We will start by learning more about this alliance that is due to come into effect in the next few years, and then the article will examine the reality of the situation to come to a conclusion on what the Group’s chances of success may be.