The impact of board independence and ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed companies

Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.

Big 4 audit fee premiums for national and office-level industry leadership in the United Kingdom

The pricing of Big 4 industry leadership Is examined for a sample of U.K. publicly-listed companies, and adds to the evidence from the Australian and U.S. audit markets that city-specific industry leadership commands a fee premium. There is a significant fee premium for city-specific industry leaders relative to other Big 4 auditors, but no evidence that either the top-ranked or second-ranked firm nationally commands a fee premium relative to other Big 4 auditors, after controlling for city-level industry leadership. We also test for Big 4 fee premiums relative to non-Big 4 auditors and the U.K. data suggest a three-level hierarchy based on audit fee differentials: (1) Big 4 city-specific industry leaders have the largest fees; (2) other Big 4 auditors (noncity leaders) and second-tier national firms have comparable fees that are lower than Big 4 city leaders but larger than third-tier firms; and (3) third-tier accounting firms have the lowest fees.

External audit in the National Health Service in England and Wales:a study of an oversight body's control of auditor remuneration

In the National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales an oversight body, the Audit Commission (AC), defines the scope of the external auditors’ work, appoints the auditors and has oversight of their fees and audit quality. This heavily regulated audit regime mitigates some of the deficiencies observed in high profile corporate failures. Independence, it has been argued, is influenced by the total auditor remuneration paid by the client. In this study we examine total auditor remuneration in a regulated market which seeks to ensure audit independence and audit quality. In particular we undertake rigorous analysis of auditor remuneration by the type of auditor: We place emphasis on the differentiation between private sector firms and the AC’s in-house auditors (District Audit). Individual private audit firms charge premiums (up to 16%) for particular audit work in identified locations, but no premiums were found when we examined total auditor remuneration. The regime appears to permit efficient operation of the audit market while safeguarding both audit independence and standards.

The cost of sin:the effect of social norms on audit pricing

In this paper we provide evidence for the effects of social norms on audit pricing by studying companies belonging to the alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear power, and tobacco industries,which are often described as “sin” companies. We hypothesize that the disparities between “sin” firms operations and prevailing social norms create an adverse context which heightens the client's business risk assessment by auditors and is, thereby, reflected in the pricing decisions for audit and consulting services. Having controlled for the impact of variables relating to client attributes, auditor attributes and engagement attributes, we demonstrate that audit firms charge significantly higher audit and consulting fees to companies that deviate from prevailing social norms. Additionally,we show that audit pricing levels within the “sin” group depend both on prevailing political views and on the level of “vice” exhibited by “sin” companies.

The Audit Commission:guiding, steering and regulating local government

How does the non-executant state ensure that its agents are fulfilling their obligations to deliver nationally determined policies? In the case of elected local government in England and Wales, this function is carried out by the Audit Commission (AC) for Local Authorities and the Health Service for England and Wales. Since being established in 1983, it is the means by which local authorities are held to account by central government, both for its own purposes and on behalf of other interested stakeholders. Although the primary function of the AC is to ensure that local authorities are fulfilling their obligations, it does so by using different methods. By acting as a regulator, an independent expert, an opinion former and a mediator, the AC steers local authorities to ensure that they are compliant with the regulatory regime and are implementing legislation properly.

Audit committees in Scottish local authorities 1998-2005

During the last 15 years corporate governance has become increasingly prominent in the public sector. The Audit Commission's 1993 report on probity in local government recommended the establishment of audit committees. However, progress on this was slow, as demonstrated by a survey of Scottish local authorities by the authors in 1998. Recent major changes in government in Scotland at both a local and national level have prompted councils to improve the accountability, openness and integrity of their operations. One major aspect of this exercise was the formation of scrutiny committees to provide objective scrutiny of the process and audit committees were the most common vehicle for this. This article explores recent developments in Scottish local government and their impact on audit committees. The article also reports the results of a 2005 survey of Scottish local authorities and compares these with the 1998 survey. This indicates a significant growth in the number of audit committees in Scottish councils and although the level of their perceived effectiveness is patchy, they are a more important feature of local government than they were in 1998.

Audit accountability and government, White and Hollingsworth

Audit accountability and government, Fidelma White and Kathryn Hollingsworth, Claredon Press, 1999. 221 pp. £45.00