Chronology

In this chronological table of the ‘long’ eighteenth century I have sought to place scientific publications in the context of their cultural milieu. I have purposefully omitted birth and death dates of the great figures of the eighteenth century in preference for the dates when their most significant publications and/or other contributions appeared.

On a distinction between casual and formative variable models:theoretical issues and practical implications for organizational researchers

Formative measurement has seen increasing acceptance in organizational research since the turn of the 21st Century. However, in more recent times, a number of criticisms of the formative approach have appeared. Such work argues that formatively-measured constructs are empirically ambiguous and thus flawed in a theory-testing context. The aim of the present paper is to examine the underpinnings of formative measurement theory in light of theories of causality and ontology in measurement in general. In doing so, a thesis is advanced which draws a distinction between reflective, formative, and causal theories of latent variables. This distinction is shown to be advantageous in that it clarifies the ontological status of each type of latent variable, and thus provides advice on appropriate conceptualization and application. The distinction also reconciles in part both recent supportive and critical perspectives on formative measurement. In light of this, advice is given on how most appropriately to model formative composites in theory-testing applications, placing the onus on the researcher to make clear their conceptualization and operationalisation.

'Animal electricity' in the long eighteenth century with special reference to the Edinburgh medical school

Coleridge, looking back at the end of the ‘long eighteenth century’, remarked that the whole of natural philosophy had been ‘electrified’ by advances in the understanding of electrical phenomena. In this paper I trace the way in which these advances affected contemporary ‘neurophysiology.’ At the beginning of the long eighteenth century, neurophysiology (in spite of Swammerdam’s and Glisson’s demonstrations to the contrary) was still understood largely in terms of hollow nerves and animal spirits. At the end of that period the researches of microscopists and electricians had convinced most medical men that the old understanding had to be replaced. Walsh, Patterson, John Hunter and others had described the electric organs of electric fish. Gray and Nollet had demonstrated that electricity was not merely static, but flowed. Franklin had alerted the world to atmospheric electricity. Galvani’s frog experiments were widely known. Volta had invented his ‘pile.’ But did ‘animal electricity’ exist and was it identical to the electricity physicists studied in the inanimate world? Was the brain a gland, as Malpighi’s researches seemed to confirm., and did it secrete electricity into the nervous system? The Monros (primus and secundus), William Cullen, Luigi Galvani, Alessandro Volta, Erasmus Darwin, Luigi Rolando and François Baillarger all had their own ideas. This paper reviews these ‘long-eighteenth century’ controversies with special reference to the Edinburgh medical school and the interaction between neurophysiology and physics.

Brain and mind in the 'long' eighteenth century

How should the 'long' eighteenth century be defined? January 1, 1700 and December 31, 1799 are quite arbitrary dates. Why should they be chosen to segment our history rather than more significant periods of time, periods which have a coherent content, or are marked, perhaps, by the working out of a theme? Students of English literature sometimes take the long eighteenth century to extend from John Milton (Paradise Lost, 1667) to the passing of the first generation of Romantics (Keats (d. 1821), Shelley (d. 1822), Byron (d. 1824), Coleridge (d. 1834)). Students of British political history often take it to start with the accession of Charles II (the Restoration) in 1660 or, alternatively, the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688 and to end with the great Reform Act of 1832. Others might choose different book ends. In the history of science and philosophy the terminus a quo is sometimes taken as the publication of Descartes' scientific philosophy or, in more Anglophone zones, the 1687 publication of Newton's Principia with its vision of a 'clockwork universe'. 'Nature and Nature's laws' as Alexander Pope enthused, 'lay hid in Night: God said, Let Newton be! and all was light!'.