The impact of privatisation and regulation on the water and sewerage industry in England and Wales:a translog cost function approach

After the ten Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) of England and Wales were privatized in November 1989, the successor Water and Sewerage Companies (WASCs) faced a new regulatory regime that was designed to promote economic efficiency while simultaneously improving drinking water and environmental quality. As legally mandated quality improvements necessitated a costly capital investment programme, the industry's economic regulator, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), implemented a retail price index (RPI)+K pricing system, which was designed to compensate the WASCs for their capital investment programme while also encouraging gains in economic efficiency. In order to analyse jointly the impact of privatization, as well as the impact of increasingly stringent economic and environmental regulation on the WASCs' economic performance, this paper estimates a translog multiple output cost function model for the period 1985–1999. Given the significant costs associated with water quality improvements, the model is augmented to include the impact of drinking water quality and environmental quality on total costs. The model is then employed to determine the extent of scale and scope economies in the water and sewerage industry, as well as the impact of privatization and economic regulation on economic efficiency.

Profit, productivity and price performance changes in the water and sewerage industry:an empirical application for England and Wales

This paper aims to analyse the impact of regulation in the financial performance of the Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales over the period 1991–2008. In doing so, a panel index approach is applied across WaSCs over time to decompose unit-specific index number-based profitability growth as a function of the profitability, productivity and price performance growth achieved by benchmark firms, and the catch up to the benchmark firm achieved by less productive firms. The results indicated that after 2000 there is a steady decline in average price performance, while productivity improves resulting in a relatively stable economic profitability. It is suggested that the English and Welsh water regulator is now more focused on passing productivity benefits to consumers, and maintaining stable profitability than it was in earlier regulatory periods. This technique is of great interest for regulators to evaluate the effectiveness of regulation and companies to identify the determinants of profit change and improve future performance, even if sample sizes are limited.

Regulatory price performance, excess cost indexes and profitability:how effective is price cap regulation in the water industry?

In this study we apply an index number approach to allow for cross sectional comparisons of relative profitability, productivity and price performance of the regulated Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales during the years 1991-2008. In order to better analyse the impact of regulation on WaSC performance, we decompose actual economic profits into spatial multilateral Fisher productivity (TFP) index, the inverse of which is demonstrated to be a regulatory excess cost index that measures the deviation of a firm’s actual costs from benchmark costs, and a newly developed regulatory total price performance (TPP) index, which measures the excess of regulated revenues relative to benchmark costs. Increases (decreases) in regulatory price performance are indicative of the loosening (tightening) of price cap regulation. Moreover, we also show that the relationship between actual economic profitability, regulatory excess costs and regulatory price performance indices can be used to categorize regulatory price caps as “weak”, “powerful” or “catch-up promoting”. The results indicated that throughout the entire 1991-2008 period, price caps were never “powerful”, in the sense that they required less productive firms to immediately and fully catch-up to the most productive firm to regain economic profitability. More specifically, during the years 1991-2000 price caps were “weak” as prices were high enough for the firms to achieve economic profits despite their low productivity levels. However, after 2001 prices became “catch up promoting” as they required less productive companies to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to eliminate economic losses. Finally, we emphasize that as our results also clearly demonstrated a much closer alignment between allowed revenues and benchmark costs after 2001, Ofwat’s approach during this period was not only appropriate, but should also be continued in the 2009 price review.

Scale and scope economies and the efficient vertical and horizontal configuration of the water industry:a survey of the literature

This paper surveys the literature on scale and scope economies in the water and sewerage industry. The magnitude of scale and scope economies determines the cost efficient configuration of any industry. In the case of a regulated sector, reliable estimates of these economies are relevant to inform reform proposals that promote vertical (un)bundling and mergers. The empirical evidence allows some general conclusions. First, there is considerable evidence for the existence of vertical scope economies between upstream water production and distribution. Second, there is only mixed evidence on the existence of (dis)economies of scope between water and sewerage activities. Third, economies of scale exist up to certain output level, and diseconomies of scale arise if the company increases its size beyond this level. However, the optimal scale of utilities also appears to vary considerably between countries. Finally, we briefly consider the implications of our findings for water pricing and point to several directions for necessary future empirical research on the measurement of these economies, and explaining their cross country variation.

Price-cap regulation in the English and Welsh water industry:a proposal for measuring productivity performance

Privately owned water utilities typically operate under a regulated monopoly regime. Price-cap regulation has been introduced as a means to enhance efficiency and innovation. The main objective of this paper is to propose a methodology for measuring productivity change across companies and over time when the sample size is limited. An empirical application is developed for the UK water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) for the period 1991-2008. A panel index approach is applied to decompose and derive unit-specific productivity growth as a function of the productivity growth achieved by benchmark firms, and the catch-up to the benchmark firm achieved by less productive firms. The results indicated that significant gains in productivity occurred after 2000, when the regulator set tighter reviews. However, the average WaSC still must improve towards the benchmarking firm by 2.69% over a period of five years to achieve comparable performance. This study is relevant to regulators who are interested in developing comparative performance measurement when the number of water companies that can be evaluated is limited. Moreover, setting an appropriate X factor is essential to improve the efficiency of water companies and this study helps to achieve this challenge.