The core executive's approach to regulation:from 'better regulation' to 'risk-tolerant deregulation'

This article examines changes in the New Labour core executive’s approach to regulation and its relationship with risk, through analysing documentary, legislative and press sources concerning approaches to regulatory decision-making. It claims that an initial commitment to ‘better regulation’ has gradually been replaced by explicit support for deregulation. A reduction in the scope of regulation was also promoted by the Thatcher and Major governments. The New Labour core executive shares previous (Conservative) administrations’ concern to include business in deregulatory decision-making. However, the article claims that there is one significant difference in the New Labour deregulatory approach: a new toleration of risk. Deregulation is, now, described as a corrective to regulators’ over-reactions to perceived risks, which, it is claimed, are holding back economic and technological progress. However, this new approach excludes competing views concerning how risk should be regulated. In particular, it does not engage with widespread popular views that governments should continue to protect against risk.

Dividend increases and initiations and default risk in equity returns

This study extends the Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) analysis by incorporating default risk. Using data for firms that either increased or initiated cash dividend payments during the 23-year period 1986-2008, we find reduction in default risk. This reduction is shown to be a priced risk factor beyond the Fama and French (1993) risk measures, and it explains the dividend payment decision and the positive market reaction around dividend increases and initiations. Further analysis reveals that the reduction in default risk is a significant factor in explaining the 3-year excess returns following dividend increases and initiations. © Copyright Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2011.