Food colours:a study of the effects of regulation

In the 1960s the benefits of government regulation of technology were believed to outweigh any costs. But recent studies have claimed that regulation has negative effects on innovation, health and consumer choice. This case study on food colours examines such claims. EFFECTS ON HEALTH were measured by allocating a hazard rating to each colour. The negative list of 1925 removed three harmful colours which were rapidly replaced, so the benefits were short-lived. Had a proposed ban been adopted in the 1860s it would have prevented many years exposure to hazardous mineral colours. The positive list of 1957 reduced the proportion of harmful coal tar dyes from 54% of the total to 20%. Regulations brought a greater reduction in hazard levels than voluntary trade action. Delays in the introduction of a positive list created a significant hazard burden. EFFECTS ON INNOVATION were assessed from patents and discovery dates. Until the 1950s food colours were adopted from textile colours. The major period of innovation for coal tar colours was between 1856 and 1910, finishing well before regulations were made in 1957, so regulations cannot be blamed for the decline. Regulations appear to have spurred the development of at least one new coal tar dye, and many new plant colours, creating a new sector of the dye industry. EFFECTS ON CONSUMER CHOICE were assessed by case studies. Coloured milk, for example, was banned despite its popularity. Regulations have restricted choice, but have removed from the market foods that were nutritionally impoverished and poor value for money. Compositional regulations provided health protection because they reduced total exposure to colours from certain staple foods. Restricting colours to a smaller range of foods would be an effective way of coping with problems of quality and imperfect toxicological knowledge today.

A critical evaluation of the volume, relevance and quality of evidence submitted by the tobacco industry to oppose standardised packaging of tobacco products

OBJECTIVES: To examine the volume, relevance and quality of transnational tobacco corporations' (TTCs) evidence that standardised packaging of tobacco products 'won't work', following the UK government's decision to 'wait and see' until further evidence is available. DESIGN: Content analysis. SETTING: We analysed the evidence cited in submissions by the UK's four largest TTCs to the UK Department of Health consultation on standardised packaging in 2012. OUTCOME MEASURES: The volume, relevance (subject matter) and quality (as measured by independence from industry and peer-review) of evidence cited by TTCs was compared with evidence from a systematic review of standardised packaging . Fisher's exact test was used to assess differences in the quality of TTC and systematic review evidence. 100% of the data were second-coded to validate the findings: 94.7% intercoder reliability; all differences were resolved. RESULTS: 77/143 pieces of TTC-cited evidence were used to promote their claim that standardised packaging 'won't work'. Of these, just 17/77 addressed standardised packaging: 14 were industry connected and none were published in peer-reviewed journals. Comparison of TTC and systematic review evidence on standardised packaging showed that the industry evidence was of significantly lower quality in terms of tobacco industry connections and peer-review (p<0.0001). The most relevant TTC evidence (on standardised packaging or packaging generally, n=26) was of significantly lower quality (p<0.0001) than the least relevant (on other topics, n=51). Across the dataset, TTC-connected evidence was significantly less likely to be published in a peer-reviewed journal (p=0.0045). CONCLUSIONS: With few exceptions, evidence cited by TTCs to promote their claim that standardised packaging 'won't work' lacks either policy relevance or key indicators of quality. Policymakers could use these three criteria-subject matter, independence and peer-review status-to critically assess evidence submitted to them by corporate interests via Better Regulation processes.