43 resultados para Privatisation
Resumo:
This article examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a sample of large Hungarian companies for 1996–99. We test the basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between incumbent employees and managers, which the data do not reject. In particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust difference relates to state sector workers versus privatised firms with majority foreign ownership.
Resumo:
Using panel data on large Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change during the period 1996-2002. We find that privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth and that, in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Interestingly, we find that being privatised has a positive impact on employment growth but that this impact is concentrated within a range of three to six years after privatisation. In contrast with the findings of earlier literature, we find evidence that there are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. On the other hand, employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these combined results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is constrained by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints. Consistent with this, we find that privatised companies, three to six years post-privatisation, are the firms for whom employment is most responsive to positive sales growth and as such, offer the best hope for rapid labour market expansion.
Resumo:
This paper examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a sample of large Hungarian companies for the period of 1996-1999. We test the basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between the incumbent employees and the managers, which we are unable to reject. In particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust difference relate to state sector workers versus the privatised firms with the majority foreign ownership. We examine several extensions. We augment the bargaining specification by controls related to workers' skills and find that the basic findings are robust to that. We take a closer look at the outside options of the workers. We find some interactive effects, where unemployment modify the impact of availability of rents on wages. We interpret our results as an indication that bargaining power of workers may be affected by changes in their outside options. We also experiment with one concise indicator of reservation wage which is closest to the theoretical model specification and combines sectoral wages, unemployment benefits and regional unemployment levels,. We found that measure performing well. Finally, we found that while responsiveness of wages towards ability to pay is higher in the state sector, variation in wage dynamics is lower. This may indicate some wage smoothing in the state sector, consistent with the preferences of employees.
Resumo:
The purpose of this article is to compare economic discussion on privatisation, expected privatisation outcomes and actual results in Poland. First it discusses the privatisation of state enterprises in the broader context of the economic transformation programme designed and introduced at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990. It examines the choice of privatisation methods, the political economy of privatisation and the three major policy issues: pace of privatisation, sequence of privatisation and the authority to initiate and carry out privatisation. The final section compares privatisation blueprints and actual results. The appendix presents a detailed technical guide to the privatisation methods in Poland and a basic set of figures illustrating the outcome.
Resumo:
Using a data set for the 162 largest Hungarian firms during the period of 1994-1999, this paper explores the determinants of equity shares held by both foreign investors and Hungarian corporations. Evidence is found for a post-privatisation evolution towards more homogeneous equity structures, where dominant categories of Hungarian and foreign owners aim at achieving controlling stakes. In addition, focusing on firm-level characteristics we find that exporting firms attract foreign owners who acquire controlling equity stakes. Similarly, firm-size measurements are positively associated with the presence of foreign investors. However, they are negatively associated with 100% foreign ownership, possibly because the marginal costs of acquiring additional equity are growing with the size of the assets. The results are interpreted within the framework of the existing theory. In particular, following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) we argue that equity should not be treated as an exogenous variable. As for specific determinants of equity levels, we focus on informational asymmetries and (unobserved) ownership-specific characteristics of foreign investors and Hungarian investors.
Resumo:
After the ten Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) of England and Wales were privatized in November 1989, the successor Water and Sewerage Companies (WASCs) faced a new regulatory regime that was designed to promote economic efficiency while simultaneously improving drinking water and environmental quality. As legally mandated quality improvements necessitated a costly capital investment programme, the industry's economic regulator, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), implemented a retail price index (RPI)+K pricing system, which was designed to compensate the WASCs for their capital investment programme while also encouraging gains in economic efficiency. In order to analyse jointly the impact of privatization, as well as the impact of increasingly stringent economic and environmental regulation on the WASCs' economic performance, this paper estimates a translog multiple output cost function model for the period 1985–1999. Given the significant costs associated with water quality improvements, the model is augmented to include the impact of drinking water quality and environmental quality on total costs. The model is then employed to determine the extent of scale and scope economies in the water and sewerage industry, as well as the impact of privatization and economic regulation on economic efficiency.
Resumo:
Nigeria is richly endowed with oil and gas resources, but the country’s continued reliance on loans from international financial institutions raises questions about the transparency and accountability of its utilisation of the huge revenues resulting from these two resources. In order to attract international capital to bolster its revenues from sales of oil and gas, a huge proportion of which continues to be used corruptly, the World Bank has encouraged the Nigerian government to subscribe to neoliberal economic policies by enlisting accounting firms and privatising state-owned enterprises. Key justifications for this have included enhancing accountability, reducing public-sector corruption, promoting market efficiency and attracting international capital. However, this paper presents evidence of the role of accounting in the undervaluation of assets, concealment of possible malpractice, and subversion of the accountability that it should have delivered in the privatisation process. The assumption that accounting will enhance accountability, reduce public-sector corruption and promote market efficiency in privatisation, and ultimately attract investment into a crony capitalist Nigerian state, appears to be an illusion created partly through the apparent legitimacy of accounting.
Resumo:
The Chinese chemical industry is facing fierce competition and changing market dynamics due to the change in the country's economic policy. Its government has applied administr.ttive actions rather than simply relying on the market to address the changing dynamics. It has attempted to privatise government-owned enterprises by corporatisation coupled with industrial restructuring. This paper uses a case study of Peony Printing Ink Co Ltd, a state-owned chemical enterprise, to illustrate the effectiveness of developing internal competences to improve long-term operational performance rather than the adoption of a privatisation approach.
Resumo:
The chemical industry in China is facing fierce competition and exposure to market forces as a result of changes in the country's economic policy. The Chinese government has applied administrative actions rather than simply relying on market forces to address the changing dynamics. It has attempted to privatise state-owned chemical enterprises (SOCEs) by corporatisation, coupled with industrial restructuring by merging individual state-owned enterprises into groups. Based on a quantitative survey in combination with case studies of two Chinese chemical enterprises, this paper concludes that in this industry building competences is more effective than privatisation and restructuring to improve performance.
Resumo:
Purpose – This paper sets out to explore the proposition that building competences is more effective than privatisation and restructuring to improve performance in the Chinese chemical industry. Design/methodology/approach – Case study research has been undertaken in the Chinese chemical industry. The two case companies provide representative data on the factors under investigation. The case investigations that are described were complemented by a survey, the results of which have been reported elsewhere. Findings – Results obtained from the research show that privatisation of Chinese state-owned enterprises is not always an effective strategy to improve performance. In the case study companies, the development of core competences was more effective in enhancing performance. Research limitations/implications – The research results are limited by the scope of the study, which was carried out in the Chinese chemical industry. They are also based on in-depth case investigations in only two companies, but are supported by a large-scale survey reported elsewhere. The results have implications for academic researchers interested in China's privatisation programme. Practical implications – The research has practical implications for companies outside China that are considering collaborative operations with Chinese companies or investing in joint ventures. It also has implications for suppliers or customers of Chinese companies. Originality/value – The paper is based on original case study investigations carried out in Chinese enterprises and is supported by a survey of representative companies in China's chemical sector. Value is derived from understanding the basis of improved performance in the companies studied.
Resumo:
This note explores the regulatory process of UK privatised utilities through the periodic review of prices. It provides a brief history of the privatisation programme in the UK and the theoretical arguments for the price-cap regulation that has been used. It argues that regulatory process appears to involve a covert dialogue and exchange of information between the regulator and regulated and also a second separate review process that consists of an overt dialogue. Using a semiotic analysis the authors suggest that the unfolding of each of these overt reviews follows a very similar pattern that is constantly being re-enacted. It is concluded that further research is required into the relative importance of the two separate review processes in the setting of the price-cap.
Resumo:
The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.