An overview of psychological and neurobiological mechanisms by which early negative experiences increase risk of mood disorders

Objective: Early life experiences are associated with severe and long-lasting effects on behavioural and emotional functioning, which in turn are thought to increase the risk for unipolar depression and other disorders of affect regulation. The neurobiological and psychological mechanisms through which adverse early life experiences confer risk are poorly understood. Method: Alterations in brain structure and function in limbic and prefrontal cortical regions have been linked to early negative experiences and to mood disorders. Results: There are a number of psychological domains that may be dysfunctional in people with mood disorders, and which, if the dysfunction occurs prior to onset of mood symptoms, may signify a risk factor for depression. Cognitive dysfunction has been examined in patients with mood disorders, with some suggestion that changes in cognitive function may antedate the onset of mood symptoms, and may be exacerbated in those who experienced early negative trauma. Social cognition, including emotion comprehension, theory of mind and empathy, represent under-studied domains of psychological function that may be negatively influenced by early adverse experience. Temperament and personality factors may also leave people vulnerable to mood instability. Conclusion: This review summarizes the evidence for dysfunction in each of these domains for people with mood disorders.

The two forms of visuo-spatial perspective taking are differently embodied and subserve different spatial prepositions

We set out to distinguish level 1 (VPT-1) and level 2 (VPT-2) perspective taking with respect to the embodied nature of the underlying processes as well as to investigate their dependence or independence of response modality (motor vs. verbal). While VPT-1 reflects understanding of what lies within someone else’s line of sight, VPT-2 involves mentally adopting someone else’s spatial point of view. Perspective taking is a high-level conscious and deliberate mental transformation that is crucially placed at the convergence of perception, mental imagery, communication, and even theory of mind in the case of VPT-2. The differences between VPT-1 and VPT-2 mark a qualitative boundary between humans and apes, with the latter being capable of VPT-1 but not of VPT-2. However, our recent data showed that VPT-2 is best conceptualized as the deliberate simulation or emulation of a movement, thus underpinning its embodied origins. In the work presented here we compared VPT-2 to VPT-1 and found that VPT-1 is not at all, or very differently embodied. In a second experiment we replicated the qualitatively different patterns for VPT-1 and VPT-2 with verbal responses that employed spatial prepositions. We conclude that VPT-1 is the cognitive process that subserves verbal localizations using “in front” and “behind,” while VPT-2 subserves “left” and “right” from a perspective other than the egocentric. We further conclude that both processes are grounded and situated, but only VPT-2 is embodied in the form of a deliberate movement simulation that increases in mental effort with distance and incongruent proprioception. The differences in cognitive effort predict differences in the use of the associated prepositions. Our findings, therefore, shed light on the situated, grounded and embodied basis of spatial localizations and on the psychology of their use.

Maternal mind-mindedness during infancy, general parenting sensitivity and observed child feeding behavior:a longitudinal study

Maternal mind-mindedness, or the tendency to view the child as a mental agent, has been shown to predict sensitive and responsive parenting behavior. As yet the role of mind-mindedness has not been explored in the context of feeding interactions. This study evaluates the relations between maternal mind-mindedness at 6 months of infant age and subsequently observed maternal sensitivity and feeding behaviors with children at age 1 year. Maternal mind-mindedness was greater in mothers who had breast-fed compared to formula-fed. Controlling for breast-feeding, mind-mindedness at 6 months was correlated with observations of more sensitive and positive feeding behaviors at 1 year of age. Mind-mindedness was also associated with greater general maternal sensitivity in play and this general parenting sensitivity mediated the effect of mind-mindedness on more sensitive and positive feeding behaviors. Interventions to promote maternal tendency to consider their child's mental states may encourage more adaptive parental feeding behaviors. © 2014 Taylor & Francis.

Towards a unified definition of supply chain management:the four fundamentals

A wide range of definitions of supply chain management (SCM) have been developed over the last three decades. The philosophy of SCM is based firmly on a recognition that it is only by working in a more integrated manner that competitive advantage can be maximised. However, for this to become a reality the development of common definitions and understandings between supply chain partners is a critical success factor. The corollary of this is that a lack of definitional consistency and a common understanding is an inhibitor to the successful adoption of SCM thinking in practice. This paper reviews a number of definitions of SCM, as well as discussions and analyses of such definitions. This leads to the central point posited in the paper – the need for a ‘unified definition’. Such a definitional construct, labelled the Four Fundamentals of SCM, is proposed with the core of the paper providing a narrative description of this construct based on a wide range of literature.

The special case of self-perspective inhibition in mental, but not non-mental, representation

The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) has been implicated in studies of both executive and social functions. Recent meta-analyses suggest that vlPFC plays an important but little understood role in Theory of Mind (ToM). Converging neuropsychological and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) evidence suggests that this may reflect inhibition of self-perspective. The present study adapted an extensively published ToM localizer to evaluate the role of vlPFC in inhibition of self-perspective. The classic false belief, false photograph vignettes that comprise the localizer were modified to generate high and low salience of self-perspective. Using a factorial design, the present study identified a behavioural and neural cost associated with having a highly salient self-perspective that was incongruent with the representational content. Importantly, vlPFC only differentiated between high versus low salience of self-perspective when representing mental state content. No difference was identified for non-mental representation. This result suggests that different control processes are required to represent competing mental and non-mental content.

Multiple roles for executive control in belief-desire reasoning:distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning

Belief-desire reasoning is a core component of 'Theory of Mind' (ToM), which can be used to explain and predict the behaviour of agents. Neuroimaging studies reliably identify a network of brain regions comprising a 'standard' network for ToM, including temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex. Whilst considerable experimental evidence suggests that executive control (EC) may support a functioning ToM, co-ordination of neural systems for ToM and EC is poorly understood. We report here use of a novel task in which psychologically relevant ToM parameters (true versus false belief; approach versus avoidance desire) were manipulated orthogonally. The valence of these parameters not only modulated brain activity in the 'standard' ToM network but also in EC regions. Varying the valence of both beliefs and desires recruits anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting a shared inhibitory component associated with negatively valenced mental state concepts. Varying the valence of beliefs additionally draws on ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, reflecting the need to inhibit self perspective. These data provide the first evidence that separate functional and neural systems for EC may be recruited in the service of different aspects of ToM.