Still entrenched in the conflict/cooperation dichotomy? EU–Russia relations and the Ukraine crisis

The article highlights that the traditional conflict/cooperation dichotomy which characterised the dynamic of European Union (EU)–Russia relation during the post-Cold War period has remained stable throughout the Ukraine crisis. It identifies a pattern of continuity rather than change in the main characteristics of the traditional conflict/cooperation dichotomy: the post-Cold War order on the European continent, values and worldviews, perceptions of self and other, and policies towards each other and post-Soviet space. Secondly, in tune with neoclassical realism the article aims to account for the relative persistence of the conflict/cooperation dichotomy. It argues that the dynamic of EU–Russia relations remained rather stable due to the fact that neither the EU nor Russian foreign policy has undergone major transformations (of both power, scope and organisation) that would provide incentive or constrains for a complete overhaul of the conflict/cooperation dichotomy. Moreover, the article claims that the relative stability of world politics since the start of the Ukraine crisis has not given any the EU and Russia incentives – or constrained them – to seek to change the overall dynamic of their relationship.

Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations

The Ukraine crisis and Russia’s contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding the possible emergence of a new ‘Cold War’ in Europe. At the same time, Ukraine’s popular choice and enthusiasm for European integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv seem to have caused Russia to adopt a (neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations between Russia and the EU (and the West for that matter) have been limited, frozen and directed on path towards conflict. This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in EU–Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The article contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation between the EU and Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to ignore key tensions that characterized their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies three such tensions: the first emphasizes divisions between EU member states and their impact on coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia’s security interests have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict virtually unavoidable.