Asymmetric price transmission in EU petroleum markets

This research investigates the determinants of asymmetric price transmission (APT) in European petroleum markets. APT is the faster response of retail prices to cost increases than to cost decreases; resulting in a welfare transfer from consumers to fuel retailers. I investigate APT at 3 different levels: the EU, the UK and at the Birmingham level. First, I examine the incidence of asymmetries in the retail markets of six major EU countries; significant asymmetries are found in all countries except from the UK. The market share data suggest that asymmetries are more important in more concentrated markets; this finding supports the collusion theory. I extend the investigation to 12 EU countries and note that APT is greater in diesel markets. The cross-country analysis suggests that vertical and horizontal concentration at least partly explains the degree of asymmetry. I provide evidence justifying scrutiny over retail markets’ pricing and structure. Second daily data unveil the presence of APT in the UK fuel markets. I use break tests to identify segments with different pricing regimes. Two main types of periods are identified: periods of rising oil price exhibit significant asymmetries whilst periods of recession do not. Our results suggest that oligopolistic coordination between retailers generate excess rents during periods of rising oil price whilst the coordination fails due to price wars when oil prices are going downwards. Finally I investigate the pricing behaviour of petroleum retailers in the Birmingham (UK) area for 2008. Whilst the market structure data reveals that the horizontal concentration is higher than the national UK average, I find no evidence of APT. In contrast, I find that retail prices are sticky upwards and downwards and that firms with market power (majors and supermarkets) adjust their prices slower than other firms.

Why the U.S. Justice Department must act against Moody's Corporation

This short note discusses the importance of the decision facing the U.S. Justice Department in the near future regarding whether or not to take action against Moody’s Corp. for its actions in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis. Having already fined Standard & Poor’s a record $1.375 billion for defrauding investors, the Justice Department faces a much different proposition. This note establishes just some of the reasons why it is imperative that Moody’s is punished, even if ultimately the punishment is less noticeable than that given to Standard & Poor’s.