Liberty in Things Doubtful or Indifferent: Sources and Expressions of Anglican Toleration in the American Colonies

Richard Hooker and John Locke were important sources for the thought and public lives of Anglican leaders in the North American colonies. A conviction about religious freedom of conscience during the first half of the eighteenth century constitutes a range of thinking about toleration that contributed to the birth of the republic.

Embodied Religion and Liberal Society: The Obstacle of De Facto Established Religion

Recent scholarship suggests that religion should be conceived in terms of embodied social practices as much as (if not more than) a set of systematic beliefs. Such accounts of religion, I will argue, raise problems that have not been adequately treated in current discussion of the role of religion in liberal society.

Clearing Up Confusions about Religion and Evolution

A number of confusions plague the debate concerning religion and evolution. Included here are the belief that religion and science must be incompatible and the thesis that evolution is evidence for atheism. Clearing up these confusions helps remove obstacles to genuine dialogue, while acknowledging that difficulties remain.

Made in God's Image! - What Does It Mean? Science and Religion in Conversation

How can we best interpret the traditional Christian affirmation that human beings are made in God's image in light of contact and dialogue between religion and science? And what, if any, are the environmental implications of this conversation between the two?

Delineating the Boundaries for Religious Speech in Public Discourse in Kierkegaard and Habermas

How is it that one of the most famous Christian thinkers - Soren Kierkegaard -- and one of the most famous contemporary secular thinkers -- Jurgen Habermas - both agree: the religious has nothing to say in the public realm of social, ethical discourse.

Reformed Epistemology, Clairvoyance, and the Role of Evidence

Reformed epidemiologists like Alvin Plantinga and William Alston are well known for their view that one can rationally believe that God exists without believing on the basis of any evidence - scientific, philosophical, or otherwise. I defend reformed epistemology from objections (including one having to do with clairvoyance), and I develop a view about the role that evidence should play in the rationality of theistic belief.

Affect and the Problem of Evil

A central aspect of the problem of evil or the argument from evil is the intensity or quantity of suffering. This quantity is conceived of as something objective and fixed. But because our experience is in part constituted and interpreted by our effectual orientation, there is no such objective quantum of suffering. But where there is no objective quantum of suffering, the argument from evil collapses. Here we begin by examining the connection between the philosophical and existential dimensions of the problem of and argument from evil as suffering. Next we consider the role of the affect in the constitution and interpretation of experience generally, together with implications for the argument from suffering. Third, we look at how a key affectual element of the argument from evil might undercut that argument. And finally, we consider a proposal to categorize suffering as a species of moral or spiritual failure, as affectually wrong.

A Mea Culpa for The Felix Culpa? A Greater Goods Response to the Problems of Evil and Hell

In this paper I want to develop a particular kind of greater-good response to the problems of evil and hell, one which hence can serve as a backup plan should the free will defense not satisfy. Ultimately, this response will appear to belong to several traditions in theodicy. Like all greater-goods views, this one relies on explaining the existence of evil in terms of the greater goods that come out of it. Among these goods are the greater goods of Incarnation and Atonement, their respective goodness consisting in large part in the higher-order divine good of glorifying God through the display of divine virtue.

Religion, Democracy and the Public Sphere

Throughout the development and maturation of the American democratic experience, religiously inspired conduct has contributed significantly to democratically progressive political concerns such as the abolition of slavery and campaigns for civil rights, but also the encouragement and perpetuation pf anti-democratic practices such as the institution of slavery and policies of racial segregation. It may be rarely admitted, but there is no essential conceptual affinity between conduct proper to democratic political association. It may, therefore, be useful in our own political circumstances to try to determine boundaries for conduct that expresses and satisfies compatibly both religious and democratic commitments. Perhaps most Americans do recognize – if not in their own cases, at least in reference to the beliefs and actions of others – that religiously inspired conduct is neither thereby justified morally or legally nor absolved from further critical appraisal. Certainly, the history of American legal practice shows that religious belief or inspiration does not serve as acceptable legal defense for conduct charged as criminal infraction. The U.S. Constitution contains only two references to religion: the non-establishment clause prohibits governmental institutionalization of religious beliefs or liberty rights – is limited in scope and application both by other constitutional rights of individuals and by constitutionally authorized powers of government. As the U.S.S.C. has repeatedly held, individual constitutional features must be understood in a manner that harmonizes all stated and implied constitutional features, not by unbridled abstractions of selected phrases. Under the American legal system, there is no absolute or unlimited right to free exercise of religion: not everything done publicly under religious inspiration is legally permissible; what is otherwise illegal conduct is not legalized by religious inspiration. In important respects, general features of the legal boundaries concerning religiously inspired conduct in public life are reasonably clear; nevertheless, broader issues concerning further moral or ethical constraints upon religiously inspired conduct remain unresolved and rarely addressed explicitly.

Religious Liberty Laws, Religious Practices, and Discrimination

A set of clarificatory questions I wish to address are: What qualifies as a religious belief? Can corporations have such beliefs? What qualifies a practice as a religious practice? What religious practices are/should be protected by RFRA laws?

Do You Have To Be Religious To Find Meaning In Life

Featured Speaker