Wendell Berry's Critique of E. O. Wilson on Science

Drawing on the work of Wendell Berry, among others, allows us to see through claims that science has on limits (scientism). Berry shows what follies scientism generates and provides his own guidelines to what the limits of science are or ought to be.

Embodied Religion and Liberal Society: The Obstacle of De Facto Established Religion

Recent scholarship suggests that religion should be conceived in terms of embodied social practices as much as (if not more than) a set of systematic beliefs. Such accounts of religion, I will argue, raise problems that have not been adequately treated in current discussion of the role of religion in liberal society.

Reformed Epistemology, Clairvoyance, and the Role of Evidence

Reformed epidemiologists like Alvin Plantinga and William Alston are well known for their view that one can rationally believe that God exists without believing on the basis of any evidence - scientific, philosophical, or otherwise. I defend reformed epistemology from objections (including one having to do with clairvoyance), and I develop a view about the role that evidence should play in the rationality of theistic belief.

Affect and the Problem of Evil

A central aspect of the problem of evil or the argument from evil is the intensity or quantity of suffering. This quantity is conceived of as something objective and fixed. But because our experience is in part constituted and interpreted by our effectual orientation, there is no such objective quantum of suffering. But where there is no objective quantum of suffering, the argument from evil collapses. Here we begin by examining the connection between the philosophical and existential dimensions of the problem of and argument from evil as suffering. Next we consider the role of the affect in the constitution and interpretation of experience generally, together with implications for the argument from suffering. Third, we look at how a key affectual element of the argument from evil might undercut that argument. And finally, we consider a proposal to categorize suffering as a species of moral or spiritual failure, as affectually wrong.

The Double‐Edged Sword Of Interdict: Some More Warnings From History

In this paper I revisit the age-old question of the relationship between philosophy and theology by rejecting the claim that throughout the history of the Christian Church, whenever Christian thinkers have baptized philosophy, they have done so to the detriment of theology. Church history reveals just the opposite, i. e., that sometimes theologians have creatively and fruitfully used philosophical language, concepts, methods, and conclusions to understand and express the faith. In addition, church history records numerous attempts to limit philosophical enquiry for theological reasons that proved unsuccessful and counter-productive. Both types of interaction between philosophy and theology occurred at the University of Paris during the thirteenth century. Despite repeated efforts of some officials to place philosophy under interdict, that is, to ban the reading of particular philosophical works or the teaching of philosophical propositions from the university faculties, a series of university theologians applied Aristotelian tools of enquiry to questions about the Christian faith with positive and constructive results. If academic theology at Paris during the thirteenth century has anything to teach us, it is that interdict cuts both ways. It might protect some theological claims from philosophical contamination or compromise, but it can also insulate theological claims from much needed critical analysis. The thinkers and developments surveyed in this paper suggest that perhaps instead of placing deconstruction under interdict, today’s Christian thinkers should use some of the language, concepts, methods and conclusions of Derrida to further theological understanding.

God: Savior, Butcher, Or Oblivious Artist? The Theodicy Of Alfred North Whitehead

This paper is a critical examination of Alfred North Whitehead's attempt to solve the traditional problem of evil. Whitehead's conception of evil is crucial to his process cosmology because it is integral to his process cosmology because it is integral to his notion of creation in which evil is understood in relationship to the larger dynamic of God’s creative activity. While Whitehead’s process theodicy is interesting, he fails to successfully escape between the horns of the traditional dilemma. Whitehead is often criticized for treating evil as merely apparent. While some process philosophers, notably Maurice Barineau, have defended Whitehead from this charge, it can be shown that this is an implication of Whitehead’s approach. Moreover, Whitehead’s theodicy fails to address radical moral evil in its concrete dimension in respect to real human suffering. As a result, Whitehead’s theodicy is not relevant to Christian theology. My paper is divided into two parts. I will first briefly discuss the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional solutions proposed to resolve it. The reminder of the paper will demonstrate why Whitehead’s theodicy addresses the traditional problem of evil only at the expense of theological irrelevancy.

A Physicalist View Of The Passion Of Christ

My project in this paper is to provide a plausible idea of Christ’s suffering and death in terms of a theory of the human person. More specifically, I want to contrast two major theories of the person-body relation. One is dualism. Dualism is the view that a human person is composed of two substances, that is, a soul and a body, and he (strictly speaking) is identical with the soul. On the other hand, physicalism is the view that a human person is numerically identical with his biological body. I will argue that dualism is not successful in explaining Christ’s passion for some reasons. Rather, physicalism, as I shall argue, provides a better explanation of how Christ’s physical suffering and death are real just like everyone else’s, so it is philosophically and theologically more plausible than dualism.

A Mea Culpa for The Felix Culpa? A Greater Goods Response to the Problems of Evil and Hell

In this paper I want to develop a particular kind of greater-good response to the problems of evil and hell, one which hence can serve as a backup plan should the free will defense not satisfy. Ultimately, this response will appear to belong to several traditions in theodicy. Like all greater-goods views, this one relies on explaining the existence of evil in terms of the greater goods that come out of it. Among these goods are the greater goods of Incarnation and Atonement, their respective goodness consisting in large part in the higher-order divine good of glorifying God through the display of divine virtue.

Religion, Democracy and the Public Sphere

Throughout the development and maturation of the American democratic experience, religiously inspired conduct has contributed significantly to democratically progressive political concerns such as the abolition of slavery and campaigns for civil rights, but also the encouragement and perpetuation pf anti-democratic practices such as the institution of slavery and policies of racial segregation. It may be rarely admitted, but there is no essential conceptual affinity between conduct proper to democratic political association. It may, therefore, be useful in our own political circumstances to try to determine boundaries for conduct that expresses and satisfies compatibly both religious and democratic commitments. Perhaps most Americans do recognize – if not in their own cases, at least in reference to the beliefs and actions of others – that religiously inspired conduct is neither thereby justified morally or legally nor absolved from further critical appraisal. Certainly, the history of American legal practice shows that religious belief or inspiration does not serve as acceptable legal defense for conduct charged as criminal infraction. The U.S. Constitution contains only two references to religion: the non-establishment clause prohibits governmental institutionalization of religious beliefs or liberty rights – is limited in scope and application both by other constitutional rights of individuals and by constitutionally authorized powers of government. As the U.S.S.C. has repeatedly held, individual constitutional features must be understood in a manner that harmonizes all stated and implied constitutional features, not by unbridled abstractions of selected phrases. Under the American legal system, there is no absolute or unlimited right to free exercise of religion: not everything done publicly under religious inspiration is legally permissible; what is otherwise illegal conduct is not legalized by religious inspiration. In important respects, general features of the legal boundaries concerning religiously inspired conduct in public life are reasonably clear; nevertheless, broader issues concerning further moral or ethical constraints upon religiously inspired conduct remain unresolved and rarely addressed explicitly.

Liberty in Things Doubtful or Indifferent: Sources and Expressions of Anglican Toleration in the American Colonies

Richard Hooker and John Locke were important sources for the thought and public lives of Anglican leaders in the North American colonies. A conviction about religious freedom of conscience during the first half of the eighteenth century constitutes a range of thinking about toleration that contributed to the birth of the republic.