A Mea Culpa for The Felix Culpa? A Greater Goods Response to the Problems of Evil and Hell

In this paper I want to develop a particular kind of greater-good response to the problems of evil and hell, one which hence can serve as a backup plan should the free will defense not satisfy. Ultimately, this response will appear to belong to several traditions in theodicy. Like all greater-goods views, this one relies on explaining the existence of evil in terms of the greater goods that come out of it. Among these goods are the greater goods of Incarnation and Atonement, their respective goodness consisting in large part in the higher-order divine good of glorifying God through the display of divine virtue.

Religion, Democracy and the Public Sphere

Throughout the development and maturation of the American democratic experience, religiously inspired conduct has contributed significantly to democratically progressive political concerns such as the abolition of slavery and campaigns for civil rights, but also the encouragement and perpetuation pf anti-democratic practices such as the institution of slavery and policies of racial segregation. It may be rarely admitted, but there is no essential conceptual affinity between conduct proper to democratic political association. It may, therefore, be useful in our own political circumstances to try to determine boundaries for conduct that expresses and satisfies compatibly both religious and democratic commitments. Perhaps most Americans do recognize – if not in their own cases, at least in reference to the beliefs and actions of others – that religiously inspired conduct is neither thereby justified morally or legally nor absolved from further critical appraisal. Certainly, the history of American legal practice shows that religious belief or inspiration does not serve as acceptable legal defense for conduct charged as criminal infraction. The U.S. Constitution contains only two references to religion: the non-establishment clause prohibits governmental institutionalization of religious beliefs or liberty rights – is limited in scope and application both by other constitutional rights of individuals and by constitutionally authorized powers of government. As the U.S.S.C. has repeatedly held, individual constitutional features must be understood in a manner that harmonizes all stated and implied constitutional features, not by unbridled abstractions of selected phrases. Under the American legal system, there is no absolute or unlimited right to free exercise of religion: not everything done publicly under religious inspiration is legally permissible; what is otherwise illegal conduct is not legalized by religious inspiration. In important respects, general features of the legal boundaries concerning religiously inspired conduct in public life are reasonably clear; nevertheless, broader issues concerning further moral or ethical constraints upon religiously inspired conduct remain unresolved and rarely addressed explicitly.

Molinism, Open Theism, and Moral Luck

It is sometimes thought that the choice between Molinism and open theism involves a trade-off in values: Molinism asserts that God has providential power but allows God indirectly to manipulate that in virtue of which human beings are to be judged; while open theism grants human beings more power over that in virtue of which they are tp be judged, but at the price of giving up providence. I argue here that this picture is misconstrued---that Molinism gives human agents more power over that in virtue of which they may be judged than does open theism. Since open theism confines the possible avenues for evaluating agents to their behavior in the actual world, open theism is incompatible with any solution to the problem of moral luck which appeals to counterfactual behavior, and so (I argue) is impugned by the problem,. Molinists, by contrast, have a promising solution to that problem.

Liberty in Things Doubtful or Indifferent: Sources and Expressions of Anglican Toleration in the American Colonies

Richard Hooker and John Locke were important sources for the thought and public lives of Anglican leaders in the North American colonies. A conviction about religious freedom of conscience during the first half of the eighteenth century constitutes a range of thinking about toleration that contributed to the birth of the republic.

Religious Liberty Laws, Religious Practices, and Discrimination

A set of clarificatory questions I wish to address are: What qualifies as a religious belief? Can corporations have such beliefs? What qualifies a practice as a religious practice? What religious practices are/should be protected by RFRA laws?

Religion in the Media

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Do You Have To Be Religious To Find Meaning In Life

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No Meaning Without God

Commentator: Bruce Ballard (Lincoln University)

Wendell Berry's Critique of E. O. Wilson on Science

Drawing on the work of Wendell Berry, among others, allows us to see through claims that science has on limits (scientism). Berry shows what follies scientism generates and provides his own guidelines to what the limits of science are or ought to be.

A Thing Called Race

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The Double‐Edged Sword Of Interdict: Some More Warnings From History

In this paper I revisit the age-old question of the relationship between philosophy and theology by rejecting the claim that throughout the history of the Christian Church, whenever Christian thinkers have baptized philosophy, they have done so to the detriment of theology. Church history reveals just the opposite, i. e., that sometimes theologians have creatively and fruitfully used philosophical language, concepts, methods, and conclusions to understand and express the faith. In addition, church history records numerous attempts to limit philosophical enquiry for theological reasons that proved unsuccessful and counter-productive. Both types of interaction between philosophy and theology occurred at the University of Paris during the thirteenth century. Despite repeated efforts of some officials to place philosophy under interdict, that is, to ban the reading of particular philosophical works or the teaching of philosophical propositions from the university faculties, a series of university theologians applied Aristotelian tools of enquiry to questions about the Christian faith with positive and constructive results. If academic theology at Paris during the thirteenth century has anything to teach us, it is that interdict cuts both ways. It might protect some theological claims from philosophical contamination or compromise, but it can also insulate theological claims from much needed critical analysis. The thinkers and developments surveyed in this paper suggest that perhaps instead of placing deconstruction under interdict, today’s Christian thinkers should use some of the language, concepts, methods and conclusions of Derrida to further theological understanding.