Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.

A two-dimensional analysis of the impact of outward FDI on performance at home: evidence from Japanese manufacturing firms

This paper empirically investigates two areas of changes in firm behavior and performance at home before and after investing abroad. The first change is dependent upon the type of foreign direct investment (FDI): horizontal FDI or vertical FDI. The second change is dependent upon the firm’s domestic activities: production activities or non-production activities. From a theoretical standpoint, the impact of outward FDIs differs not only by type, but according to the firm’s activities. By exploiting two types of firm-level data that enable us to distinguish between production and non-production activities, our paper provides a detailed picture of the intra-firm changes in behavior and performance that occur as a result of production globalization.

Domestic, vertical, and horizontal multinationals : a general equilibrium approach using the "knowledge capital model"

One of the key factors behind the growth in global trade in recent decades is an increase in intermediate input as a result of the development of vertical production networks (Feensta, 1998). It is widely recognized that the formation of production networks is due to the expansion of multinational enterprises' (MNEs) activities. MNEs have been differentiated into two types according to their production structure: horizontal and vertical foreign direct investment (FDI). In this paper, we extend the model presented by Zhang and Markusen (1999) to include horizontal and vertical FDI in a model with traded intermediates, using numerical general equilibrium analysis. The simulation results show that horizontal MNEs are more likely to exist when countries are similar in size and in relative factor endowments. Vertical MNEs are more likely to exist when countries differ in relative factor endowments, and trade costs are positive. From the results of the simulation, lower trade costs of final goods and differences in factor intensity are conditions for attracting vertical MNEs.

China's regional economies and value chains : an interregional input-output analysis

Attempts to understand China’s role in global value chains have often noted the case of Apple's iPhone production, in particular the fact that the value added during the Chinese portion of the iPhone’s supply chain is no more than 4%. However, when we examine the Chinese economy as a whole in global production networks, China’s share in total induced value added by China’s exports of final products to the USA is about 75% in 2005. This leads us to investigate how Chinese value added is created and distributed not only internationally but also domestically. To elucidate the increasing complexity of China’s domestic production networks, this paper focuses on the measure of Domestic Value Chains (DVCs) across regions and their linkages with global markets. By using China’s 1997 and 2007 interregional input-output tables, we can understand in detail the structural changes in domestic trade in terms of value added, as well as the position and degree of participation of different regions within the DVCs.