Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.

Food crop diversification as a risk mitigating strategy during conflict : evidence from Cote d'Ivoire

This study examines the significance of food crop diversification as a household risk mitigating strategy to achieve "self-sufficiency" to ensure food security during the civil conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. The main motivation for seeking self-sufficiency stems from the fact that during the period of heightened tension due to conflict, the north–south divide set by the UN peacekeeping line disrupted the agricultural supply chain from the food surplus zone, Savane in the north. While we theoretically predict a positive effect on crop diversification because of interrupted food supply chain, we also consider a negative effect due to the covariate shocks. We find robust and statistically significant empirical outcomes supporting such claims. The baseline outcomes withstand a series of robustness checks. The net effect of conflict on crop diversification is positive but not statistically significant. In addition, we find that increasing vulnerability to poverty and food insecurity during conflict seems to be the underlying factors that motivate farm households to adopt such coping strategies.