From foot-draggers to strategic counter-partners : the dynamics of U.S. and Chinese policies for tackling climate change

As can been seen from the U.S.'s non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, together with the negotiations toward the post-Kyoto Protocol framework, the U.S. and China have been quarrelling over their responsibilities and have contradicted one another over the introduction of compulsory domestic greenhouse gases emission reduction targets. Therefore, for a long time, it has been argued that the controversy between the two countries has hindered the process of forging an international agreement to deal with climate change. On the other hand, Sino-U.S. bilateral cooperation on climate change has significantly increased in recent years in summit talks and their Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED), especially after the 15th Conference of Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, one of whose aims was to facilitate positive negotiations for the post-Kyoto Protocol agreement. Analyzing this in the light of recent developments, we find that the U.S. and China have tended to address climate change and related issues from a pluralistic viewpoint and approach, by regarding the achievement of bilateral cooperation and global agreements as their common strategic objective.

On Labor Complementarity, Cultural Frictions and Strategic Immigration Policies

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.