Formless as Water, Flaming as a Fire-Some observations on the Theory and Practice of Self-Determination

The concept of national self-determination is a highly contested concept from very outset. It is partly due to its dual parentage, namely nationalism and liberalism. Prior to 1945 it was only a political concept without legal binding. With the incorporation of the principle in the UN Charter it was universalized and legalized. However, there were two competing interpretations at the UN based on de-colonization and representative government. How to define self and what really determined remain highly controversial. How to reconcile the international norm of sovereignty of state and self determination of people became more complex problem with the tide of secessionist movements based on ethno-nationalism. The concept of internal self-determination came as a compromise; but it is also very vague and harbors a wide range of interpretations.

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? 　　　The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. 　　　Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.

The inverted Chinese / China problem in Indonesia : a preliminary analysis on the 2011 Surabaya incident

A clash between the police and journalists covering a Falun Gong gathering in Surabaya 2011 have shown a significant change in understanding the triangular relationship between Indonesia, China and the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. During the Suharto period, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and China as a foreign state were the problems for the Indonesian government. After the political reforms in Indonesia together with the Rise of China in 2000s, in some situation, it is the Indonesian government together with the Chinese government which is the problem for some ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Ethnic Chinese people were seen to be close with China and their loyalty to the nation was doubted. But now it is the Indonesian government which is viewed as being too close to China and thus harming national integrity, and suspected of being unnationalistic.

The emerging ASEAN approach to mutual recognition : a comparison with Europe, trans-Tasman, and North America

Existing studies on mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) are mostly based on the European experience. In this paper, we will examine the ongoing attempts to establish a mutual recognition architecture in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and seek to explain the region's unique approach to MRAs, which can be classified as a "hub and spoke" model of mutual recognition. On one hand, ASEAN is attempting to establish a quasi-supranational ASEAN-level mechanism to confer "ASEAN qualification" effective in the entire ASEAN region. On the other hand, ASEAN MRAs respect members' national sovereignty, and it is national authorities, not ASEAN institutions, who have the ultimate power to approve or disapprove the supply of services by ASEAN qualification holders. Such a mixed approach to mutual recognition can be best understood as a centralized mechanism for learning-by-doing, rather than centralized recognition per se.