Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.

Vertical specialisation indicator based on supply-driven input-output model

“Import content of exports”, based on Leontief’s demand-driven input-output model, has been widely used as an indicator to measure a country’s degree of participation in vertical specialisation trade. At a sectoral level, this indicator represents the share of inter-mediates imported by all sectors embodied in a given sector’s exported output. However, this indicator only reflects one aspect of vertical specialisation – the demand side. This paper discusses the possibility of using the input-output model developed by Ghosh to measure the vertical specialisation from the perspective of the supply side. At a sector level, the Ghosh type indicator measures the share of imported intermediates used in a sector’s production that are subsequently embodied in exports by all sectors. We estimate these two indicators of vertical specialisation for 47 selected economies for 1995, 2000, 2005 using the OECD’s harmonized input-output database. In addition, the potential biases of both indicators due to the treatment of net withdrawals in inventories, are also discussed.