Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China

In the recent decade China witnessed an upsurge of privatization of small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast to the consequent sharp reduction in the number of firms, however, the estimated share of broadly-defined SOEs that includes limited liabilities companies controlled by the State has shown virtually no sign of decline. We explain the backgrounds of this seemingly paradoxical persistence of state-ownership by looking into two distinctive types of large SOEs: traditional SOEs that remain dominant in oligopolistic industries and manager-controlled SOEs surviving in competitive industries. The two types exemplify several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs. Sorting these issues out will take time, which means that instabilities associated with state corporate ownership will remain in place in the foreseeable future in China.

Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China

Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.

Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.

The Degree of Competition in the Thai Banking Industry before and after the East Asian Crisis

This paper analyzes the influence of the East Asian crisis and the subsequent reforms on the oligopolistic nature of the Thai banking industry. Since the crisis, there have been substantial changes in competitive environment, including a decline in the family ownership of banks as well as the arrival of new entrants. How did these changes affect a banking industry in which the six largest local banks accounted for over 70 percent of market share? The estimated Lerner index from Bresnahan's [1989] conjectural variation model indicates the possibility of a decline in the degree of competition.

Executive Managers in Large Mexican Family Businesses

The involvement of members of owners' families in the running of large family businesses in Mexico is decreasing. Although family members still hold key posts such as that of CEO, other executive posts tend to be delegated to professional salaried managers. Top managers, including family members, share some common characteristics. They are young compared with managers in other developed countries, their quality as human resources is high, and many of them are graduates of overseas MBA courses. Most of them are sufficiently experienced. Improvement of quality among top managers is a recent phenomenon in Mexico, and has been encouraged mainly by the following two factors. First, globalization of business activities was promoted by intense competition among firms under conditions of market liberalization. In order to equip themselves with the ability to cope with the globalization of their operations, large family businesses tried hard to improve the quality of top management, by training and educating existing managers, and/or by recruiting managers in the outside labor market. Second, developments in the Mexican economy during the 1990s led to a growth in the labor market for top managers Thus, business restructuring caused by bankruptcy, as well as mergers and acquisitions, privatization and so on, led to the dismissal of business managers who then entered the labor market in large numbers. The increasing presence of these managers in the labor market helped family businesses to recruit well-qualified senior executives.

Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

Does the use of multiple FTAs force firms to raise local input share? : evidence of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon

This paper empirically investigates the firm-level relationship between the local input share and the number of used FTAs by employing the data on FTA utilization in Japanese affiliates in ASEAN. As a result, we do not find a robust linear relationship. However, affiliates using a large number of FTAs (seven or eight) have an extremely higher share of local inputs. This result might be interpreted as the first evidence of the “spaghetti bowl phenomenon”.

Allocation efficiency in China : an extension of the dynamic Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition

This paper develops a quantitative measure of allocation efficiency, which is an extension of the dynamic Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition proposed by Melitz and Polanec (2015). The extended measure enables the simultaneous capture of the degree of misallocation within a group and between groups and parallel to capturing the contribution of entering and exiting firms to aggregate productivity growth. This measure empirically assesses the degree of misallocation in China using manufacturing firm-level data from 2004 to 2007. Misallocation among industrial sectors has been found to increase over time, and allocation efficiency within an industry has been found to worsen in industries that use more capital and have firms with relatively higher state-owned market shares. Allocation efficiency among three ownership sectors (state-owned, domestic private, and foreign sectors) tends to improve in industries wherein the market share moves from a less-productive state-owned sector to a more productive private sector.

How does firm heterogeneity information impact the estimation of embodied carbon emissions in Chinese exports?

Using an augmented Chinese input–output table in which information about firm ownership and type of traded goods are explicitly reported, we show that ignoring firm heterogeneity causes embodied CO2 emissions in Chinese exports to be overestimated by 20% at the national level, with huge differences at the sector level, for 2007. This is because different types of firm that are allocated to the same sector of the conventional Chinese input–output table vary greatly in terms of market share, production technology and carbon intensity. This overestimation of export-related carbon emissions would be even higher if it were not for the fact that 80% of CO2 emissions embodied in exports of foreign-owned firms are, in fact, emitted by Chinese-owned firms upstream of the supply chain. The main reason is that the largest CO2 emitter, the electricity sector located upstream in Chinese domestic supply chains, is strongly dominated by Chinese-owned firms with very high carbon intensity.