On Labor Complementarity, Cultural Frictions and Strategic Immigration Policies

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.

On the sustainability of a monocentric city : lower transport costs from new transport facilities

This paper proposes a general equilibrium model of a monocentric city based on Fujita and Krugman (1995). Two rates of transport costs per distance and for the same good are introduced. The model assumes that lower transport costs are available at a few points on a line. These lower costs represent new transport facilities, such as high-speed motorways and railways. Findings is that new transport facilities connecting the city and hinterlands strengthen the lock-in effects, which describes whether a city remains where it is forever after being created. Furthermore, the effect intensifies with better agricultural technologies and a larger population in the economy. The relationship between indirect utility and population size has an inverted U-shape, even if new transport facilities are used. However, the population size that maximizes indirect utility is smaller than that found in Fujita and Krugman (1995).

Minority type matters : ethnic diversity and tolerance in 29 European democracies

Past research has shown that having a large population of ethnic minorities beyond the neighborhood level arouses intolerance in the majority. However, this paper presents the argument that the effect of minority size on tolerance depends on minority type: the less subject the minority is to negative stereotyping, the more favorable the effect that minority size has on tolerance. In this study, a hierarchical linear model was applied to a dataset on advanced and emerging democracies in Europe. The analysis shows that when the duration and level of democracy are controlled for, ethnic tolerance was associated positively with native minority size and negatively with foreign population size.