The Study of International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan

The paper examines policies and activities of cultural exchange carried out by Japanese national, local and private agents since the end of WWII. Methodologically, we distinctively use the notion culture as a tool and as an object of study, and to synthesize the two in full intention, based on the debate among IR students about so called Cultural Turn in IR theories. As case studies, the Japanese experiences are examined from two points. Firstly, it is compared with the German experiences in Europe, with special attention to the construction of national identity.In both countries, the peoples tried to make use of cultural exchange activities in the management of international relations. The actual developments of cultural relations by the two countries, however, were in striking contrast to each other. Secondly, our study focuses on the explosive expansion of private sector's international cultural exchange in the 1980s in association with so called "emerging civil society" phenomenon observed worldwide throughout 1970s and 1980s. By using our original approach mentioned in the Chapter 1, the paper tries to sketch out that the increase of the private organizations is largely the response of the Japanese society to outside influences, not something genuinely outgrown from within the society itself due to mainly domestic causes.

Political limits on the world oil trade : firm-level evidence from US firms

International politics affect trade patterns, especially for firms in extractive industries. We construct the firm-level dataset for the U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2010 to test whether the state of international relations with the trading partners of the U.S. affect importing behavior of the U.S. firms. To measure "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners we use voting records for the UN General Assembly. We find that the U.S. firms, in fact, import significantly less oil from the political opponents of the U.S. Our conjecture is that the decrease in oil imports is mainly driven by large, vertically-integrated U.S. firms that engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) overseas.

The effects of international politics on oil-exporting developing countries

International politics affects oil trade. But does it affect the oil-exporting developing countries more? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to changes in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To the extent that developing countries have higher hold-up risks because of their weaker institutions, the political effect on oil trade should be more significant in the developing world. We find that oil import decisions are indeed more elastic when firms import from developing countries, although the reverse is true in the short run. Our results suggest that international politics can affect oil revenue and hence long-term development in the developing world.

Political influence in commercial and financial oil trading : the evidence from US firms

International politics affects oil trade. But do financial and commercial traders who participate in spot oil trading also respond to changes in international politics? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to increases in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. However, the political pattern of oil imports is not entirely driven by the concerns of hold-up risks, which exist when oil transactions via term contracts are associated with backward vertical FDI that is subject to expropriation. In particular, our results indicate that even financial and commercial traders significantly reduce their oil imports from U.S. political enemies. Interestingly, while these traders diversify their oil imports politically immediately after changes in international politics, other oil companies reduce their oil imports with a significant time lag. Our findings suggest that in designing regulations to avoid harmful repercussions on commodity and financial assets, policymakers need to understand the nature of political risk.

Why do oil importers diversify their import sources politically? : evidence from U.S. firm-level data

International politics affects oil trade. But why? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine what kinds of firms are more responsive to change in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To test this hold-up risk hypothesis, we investigate heterogeneity in responses by matching transaction-level import data with firm-level worldwide reserves. Our results show that long-run oil import decisions are indeed more elastic for firms with oil reserves overseas than those without, although the reverse is true in the short run. We interpret this empirical regularity as that while firms trade in the spot market can adjust their imports immediately, vertically-integrated firms with investment overseas tend to commit to term contracts in the short run even though they are more responsive to changes in international politics in the long run.

ISIS and the climate of fear -- a political-psychology perspective

2014年6月のイスラーム国（以下ISIS）のメディアへの華々しい登場以降、米国政治を規定する主要な要因の1つとして「恐怖心」がかつてない程の重要性を帯びてきている。本稿では政治心理学的な分析手法を援用しつつ、ISISが何よりも「テロ攻撃集団」としていかに「恐怖心」を醸成するための洗練された戦略を実践しているか、またそれが統計的には圧倒的に中東現地のムスリム一般住民を標的にしており、本来的にS.ハンティントン的な「西欧文明に敵対するイスラーム」という問題を内包していないにもかかわらず、米国エスタブリッシュメントによる他者への「恐怖心」によって如何に本質が曲解されて「ムスリム排斥」のような情緒的な政治主張に向かわせているかの契機を分析する。筆者は論稿中でマキャベリから以降最近に至るまでの政治学関係の議論を渉猟しつつ、「恐怖心」をめぐる問題が「テロル」との関係においていかに扱われてきたかを再検討し、西欧のメディアにおける「テロ集団」としてのISISの登場が政治学的な観点から提起している問題の新しさと古さを跡付けようとする。同時に現在の米国社会を覆っているイスラモフォビアの情緒的反応についてもその淵源が古くかつ政治的に根深い問題から発していることを指摘している。本論稿の分析は直接的にはISISによって政治的な雰囲気が大きく変容するなかで大統領選挙の年を迎えている米国の国内政治を扱うものであるが、ここでの議論は「アラブの春」以降のシリア危機に発する難民問題に直面している欧州（EU）や、2015年11月のパリのテロ多発事件以降緊迫した雰囲気に覆われているフランスの政治状況にも通底しており、その意味では偶々2014年にISIS によって惹起されたとはいえそれ自体が自律的な展開の契機を内包する現代社会の政治的な抑圧的システムのグローバルな拡大と拡散に警鐘を鳴らそうとするものである。