Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition

In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.

Chairship system and decision making by consensus in international agreements : the case of ASEAN

How are different positions reconciled under decision making by consensus in international agreements? This article aims to answer this question. Consensus rule provides each participant a veto, which risks resulting in non-agreement. Taking ASEAN as a case study of international organizations that have adopted consensus rule as the main decision-making procedure, this article presents the chairship system as an analytical scheme to examine how different positions are or are not reconciled under consensus rule. The system is based on conventional knowledge regarding the chair in international conference, which can be defined as an institution where the role of the chair is taken by one member state in an international organization and plays a role in agenda-setting. The agenda-setting power given to the chair varies across organizations. This article assumes that the chair in ASEAN is given a relatively strong agenda-setting power to enable the chair to reach agreements and bias such agreements in its own favor.

Transformation of the Rice Marketing System and Myanmar's Transition to a Market Economy

Creating a rice marketing system has been one of the central policy issues in Myanmar's move to a market economy since the end of the 1980s. Two liberalizations of rice marketing were implemented in 1987 and 2003. This paper examines the essential aspects of the liberalizations and the subsequent transformation of Myanmar's rice marketing sector. It attempts to bring into clearer focus the rationale of the government's rice marketing reforms which is to maintain a stable supply of rice at a low price to consumers. Under this rationale, however, the state rice marketing sector continued to lose efficiency while the private sector was allowed to develop on condition that it did not jeopardize the rationale of stable supply at low price. The paper concludes that the prospect for the future development of the private rice marketing sector is dim since a change in the rice market's rationale is unlikely. Private rice exporting is unlikely to be permitted, while the domestic market is approaching the saturation point. Thus, there is little momentum for the private rice sector to undertake any substantial expansion of investment.