Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others’ investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.

Related Lending and Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, it was confirmed that banks lend to their related parties in many countries. The question examined in this article is whether related lending functions to alleviate the problems of asymmetric information or transfers profits from depositors and minority shareholders to related parties. The effects of related lending on the profitability and risk of banks in Indonesia are examined using panel data from 1994 to 2007 comprising a total of 74 Indonesian banks. The effects on return on asset (ROA) varied at different periods. Before and right after the crisis, a higher credit allocation to related parties increased ROA. In middle of the crisis, it turned to negative; and this has also been the case in the most recent period as the Indonesian economy has normalized. Effects of related lending on bank risk measured by the Z-score and non-performing loan is not clear. After undergoing bank restructuring, related lending has decreased and the profit structure of banks has changed.

Undermined climate policies : a study on the impact of regulatory and financial discrimination across heterogeneous firms in China

Firms in China within the same industry but with different ownership and size have very different production functions and can face very different emission regulations and financial conditions. This fact has largely been ignored in most of the existing literature on climate change. Using a newly augmented Chinese input–output table in which information about firm size and ownership are explicitly reported, this paper employs a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the impact of alternative climate policy designs with respect to regulation and financial conditions on heterogeneous firms. The simulation results indicate that with a business-as-usual regulatory structure, the effectiveness and economic efficiency of climate policies is significantly undermined. Expanding regulation to cover additional firms has a first-order effect of improving efficiency. However, over-investment in energy technologies in certain firms may decrease the overall efficiency of investments and dampen long-term economic growth by competing with other fixed-capital investments for financial resources. Therefore, a market-oriented arrangement for sharing emission reduction burden and a mechanism for allocating green investment is crucial for China to achieve a more ambitious emission target in the long run.