Post-1988 civil-military relations in Myanmar

This paper explores the development of civil–military relations in Myanmar since 1988. After the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) took over the state by means of a coup d’état in 1988, the top generals ruled the country without recourse to significant formal political institutions such as a constitution, elections and parliament. A unique authoritarian regime, where political power was predominantly under the military’s influence, lasted for more than 20 years in the country. It seemed to many observers that the military regime was highly durable and that its dictator, General Than Shwe, had no intention of altering the highly repressive character of the political system. However, a new leader, President Thein Sein, who came to power in March 2011, has decided to implement some political and economic reforms that could undermine the Tatmadaw’s dominant role in politics and the economy. This paper examines the background to this sudden political change in Myanmar, focusing on the relationship between its dictator, the military and the state. This paper’s main argument is that Than Shwe has carefully prepared the transition of 2011 as a generational change in the Tatmadaw and in state leadership. The argument is also made that the challenges created by Thein Sein can be understood as a result of his redefinition of national security and balancing of security-centralism with state-led developmentalism.

Myanmar and Japan: How Close Friends Become Estranged

Independent Myanmar and Japan had long held the strongest ties among Asian countries, and they were often known as having "special relations" or a "historically friendly relationship." Such relations were guaranteed by the sentiments and experiences of the leaders of both countries. Among others, Ne Win, former strongman throughout the socialist period (1962-1988), was educated and trained by the Japanese army officers of the Minami Kikan, leading to the birth of the Burma Independence Army (BIA). Huge official development assistance provided by the Japanese government also cemented this special relationship. However, the birth of the present military government (SLORC/SPDC) in 1988 drastically changed this favorable relationship between the two countries. When the military seized power in a coup, Japan was believed to be the only country that possessed sufficient meaningful influence on Myanmar to encourage a move toward national reconciliation between the junta and the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi. In reality, Japan failed to exert such an influence due to its sour relations with the military government and reduced influence in the new international and regional political landscape. What is worse, Japan seems to be losing its say on Myanmar issues in the international political arena, as it has been wavering in limbo between the sanctionist forces, such as the United States and the European Union, and engagement forces, such as China and ASEAN.

Myanmar Sugar SMEs: History, Technology, Location and Government Policy

Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) engaged in sugar processing in Myanmar appeared in the last decade of the socialist era. An acute sugar deficit, restricted trade in white sugar, and high demand from the conventional dairy business led to the growth of sugar SMEs by appropriate blending of semi-finished products (syrup) in the fields, which were then processed in vacuum pans and centrifugals to obtain white sugar. This became a tradable commodity and sugar SMEs grew in clusters in big cities. They are family-owned businesses. However, they lack the bagasse-based power generation. In recent years, large modern sugar factories operated by private and military companies have emerged as key players. The current shortage of fuel feedstock and competition for raw materials have become driving forces that shift sugar SMEs from market-oriented to raw material-oriented locations. Internal competition among key players made sugar price highly volatile, too. Being placed on a level playing field, the whole industry should be upgraded in terms of price and quality to become export-oriented.

中国と湾岸を結ぶ南アジア -- パキスタン・アフガニスタンの動向と関連させて

Pakistan is geographically situated between China and the Gulf. In order to balance its strategic position against the major security threat of India, Pakistan formed a special and stable strategic alliance with China against common threats since the period of the cold war even though the two countries have neither a political ideology nor political system in common. On the other hand Pakistan established another special relation with Saudi Arabia on the basis of Islamic identity. With its expanding economic capacity, China proposed a project by the name of "new silk road economic corridor" with the intention of expanding and multiplying trade routes with the Middle East and Europe. Within this framework Pakistan is expected to expand the role of an alternative land route that connects the Gulf and China for use if unfavorable emergencies occur in the Malacca route. However, the continuous political uncertainty in Afghanistan after the pullout of US-NATO fighting forces at the end of 2014 and sporadic outbreaks of terrorist acts by Pakistan Taliban in Pakistan have increased China's anxiety regarding Uyghur issues at home. Avoiding military options for the moment, China is trying to find ways to play an active role in the security issues of Afghanistan with help from Pakistan if available. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Pakistani government formed in the general election of 2008 completed its full term and transferred authority to the newly elected government in 2013, something never observed before in Pakistan's history. Coincidently, in Afghanistan the presidential election was carried out peacefully in 2014 in spite of the Taliban threat. Although it is too early to make any definite conclusion, constitutional processes, in spite of their defects, reflected to some extent wishes for normal life of the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan who were disgusted with weak governance and the prevalence of terrorism.

エジプトにおける軍の経済活動 -- スィースィー体制での役割

Since the second transition period started July 2013, the Egyptian armed forces have once again played a critical role in building a new political system. Although the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had not come to the front this time, it controlled the transition process and succeeded in keeping the privileges of the military in both political and economic fields. This paper focuses on the economic role of the military under the regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Large scale economic activity of the military started in the mid-1970s. The military expanded its grip on the domestic economy and became one of the largest producers in Egyptian civil industry. In addition to controlling a huge business empire, the military under the Sisi administration is an entity supportive of national development goals. As the backer of the current regime, the armed forces have taken on a new responsibility as a central role player in economic development.

ロシアの中東政策 -- プーチン大統領のシリア政策を通じて

The active initiative taken by Russian President Vladamir Putin by bombarding the antigovernment forces in Syria at the end of September 2015 startled the world by its precalculated boldness. Russian intervention has radically changed the dynamic of the war by empowering the Syrian government of Bashar Assad, and has resulted in a ceasefire agreement which starts on 27th February 2016, led by Russia and the US. No one can predict at present the next stage of conflicts in Syria or whether it will result in a positive solution to the tragic wars there. However, there is no denying the fact that Russia has played an important role in the development of the game. This paper analyzes the motivations of Putin in intervening in the Syrian crisis and the factors which have enabled Russia to play an enlarged role in the Middle East, seemingly beyond its objective capabilities. Legacies of international networks built during the Soviet period; shrewd tactics in making use of the inconsistency and vacillation of US policies, particularly towards the Middle East; its historical experience of interaction with the Muslim cultures, including domestic ones; its geopolitical perception of world politics, and the export of energy resources and military weapons as tools of diplomacy are some of the factors which explain Russian behavior. At the same time, the personal leadership and accumulated experience of President Putin in formulating Russian diplomacy and in manipulating different issues in a combined policy should be taken into account. His initiative in Syria succeeded to some extent in turning world attention away from the Ukrainian issue, aimed at changing the present sanctions imposed by the West. Another phenomenon to be noted in the international arena is the newly developed mutual interaction between Russia and the Arab countries in the Gulf. Frequent visits to Russia by autocratic leaders, including kings, emirsand princes do not always reflect a shared common interest between Russia and the Arab leaders. On the contrary, in spite of sharp and fundamental differences in their attitude toward the issues related to Syria, Iran and Yemen, the Arab leaders find it necessary to communicate with Russia and to know Russia’s expected strategies and intentions towards the Middle East, apart from its oil and gas policies. The Iran deal on the nuclear issue in July 2015 may have been a factor behind the phenomena.