Market Access and Intermediate Goods Trade

The role of importer access to the finished goods market in intermediate goods trade is examined by estimating the gravity-like equation derived from the NEG model. Importer access to demand for finished goods is calculated by using the estimates in the gravity equation for finished goods trade, and then intermediate goods trade is regressed on the importer access. Results indicate that imports of intermediate goods are sensitive not only to the magnitude of importer demand for finished goods but also to the demand of neighboring countries. Using results of the regression, the impact of US finished goods market expansion on intermediate goods trade in each country is simulated.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.