Changing local elite selection in Thailand : emergence of new local government presidents after direct elections and their capabilities

Before rural local government units were established in Thailand, reform debates within the country faced a crucial issue: Candidates at the rural sub-district levels might adopt electioneering methods such as vote buying and the patronage system of the local political and economic elite, the methods that had been used in the national elections. In fact, the results of the 2006 survey in this paper, which followed the introduction of direct elections in rural local government units in 2003, contrast with the result anticipated during the debates on political reform. The preliminary data of the survey shows that the decentralization process and the introduction of the direct election system in the rural areas had some effect in changing the selection process of the local elite in Thailand.

Case Study of Applied LIP Approach/Activities in the Philippines The Training Services Enhancement Project for Rural Life Improvement (TSEP-RLI) Experience

TSEP-RLI was a technical cooperation project jointly conducted by GOP thru DA-Agricultural Training Institute (ATI) and GOJ thru JICA aimed at institutionalizing the training program for Rural Life Improvement (RLI) at the (ATI). As expected, farmers, fisherfolk, women, youth and extension agents were provided with efficient and effective training services from ATI leading to the improvement of quality of life in the rural areas through efforts of human resource development. The ATI- Bohol was chosen as the model center where participatory trials and various activities of the project were undertaken for five years. These activities were participatory surveys and data collection of on-farm and off-farm productive activities; planning workshop for RLI; feedbacking of survey results and action plans to the community and the Local Government Units (LGUs), and signing of Memorandum of Agreement between the Project and participating LGUs. The above activities were done to facilitate the planning and development of most effective and necessary rural life improvement activities, to confirm the willingness of the people to support and participate and to formalize the partnership between the Project and the LGUs. Since the concept of rural life covers a vast range of activities, a consensus had been reached that the total aspects of rural life be grasped in three spheres, namely, Production & Livelihood (P/L), Rural Living Condition (RLC) and Community Environment (C/E). The RLI for Ubi (Yam) Growers was one of the pilot activities undertaken in two pilot barangays and the target beneficiaries were members of the Rural Improvement Club (RIC- a group of organized women) with the LGU of the Municipality of Corella as the implementing partner. During the planning workshop, the barangay residents articulated their desire to promote production and processing of ubi (sphere on P/L - as the entry point), lack of nutritious food was one of the identified problem (sphere on RLC- expansion point) and environmental degradation such as deforestation, and soil erosion was another problem articulated by the community people (sphere on C/E- expansion point). Major activities that were undertaken namely, Ubi cooking contest, cooking/processing seminar, training courses on entrepreneurial development, ubi production and storage technology, packaging and product design, human resource development and simplified bookkeeping motivated the beneficiaries as well as developed and enhanced their skills & capabilities while strengthening their associations. Their participation to the 5 ubi festivals and other related activities had brought some impacts on their economic and rural life improvement activities. The seven principles of TSEP-RLI include the participatory process, holistic approach, dialogical approach, bottom -up training needs assessment, demand-driven approach, cost sharing approach and collaborative implementation with other agencies including LGUs and the community.

Post-decentralization regional economies and actors -- putting the capacity of Local governments to the test

Decentralization in Indonesia was introduced institutionally in 2001, with a democratization drive promoted by international donors and by the intention of the new government to clear away the centralistic image of Soeharto. Decentralization has had some effects on regional economies and on local government administration. Compared to the period before decentralization, the share of gross regional domestic product and local government finance has increased in Java, though investment and bank borrowing have expanded to the outer islands. In qualitative aspects, decentralization has transferred not only administrative authority but also many new vested interests from the center to regions. Local governments have become more extensive economic actors in regional economies. Regional economic actors now compete actively for such vested interests and have missed the opportunity to create market-friendly regional economies. The government sector should not be a mere rent-seeking economic actor, but should play a role as a facilitator promoting private sector activities in regional economies.

Decentralization in Nation State Building of Indonesia

Introduction：Today, many countries, regardless of developed or developing, are trying to promote decentralization. According to Manor, as his quoting of Nickson’s argument, decentralization stems from the necessity to strengthen local governments as proxy of civil society to fill the yawning gap between the state and civil society (Manor [1999]: 30). With the end to the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union rendering the cause of the “leadership of the central government to counter communism” meaningless, Manor points out, it has become increasingly difficult to respond flexibly to changes in society under the centralized system. Then, what benefits can be expected from the effectuation of decentralization? Litvack-Ahmad-Bird cited the four points: attainment of allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for local public goods; improvement to government competitiveness; realization of good governance; and enhancement of the legitimacy and sustainability of heterogeneous national states (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird [1998]: 5). They all contribute to reducing the economic and social costs of a central government unable to respond to changes in society and enhancing the efficiency of state administration through the delegation of authority to local governments. Why did Indonesia have a go at decentralization? As Maryanov recognizes, reasons for the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have never been explicitly presented (Maryanov [1958]: 17). But there was strong momentum toward building a democratic state in Indonesia at the time of independence, and as indicated by provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, there was the tendency in Indonesia from the beginning to debate decentralization in association with democratization. That said debate about democratization was fairly abstract and the main points are to ease the tensions, quiet the complaints, satisfy the political forces and thus stabilize the process of government (Maryanov [1958]: 26-27). 　　　What triggered decentralization in Indonesia in earnest, of course, was the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The Soeharto regime, regarded as the epitome of the centralization of power, became incapable of effectively dealing with problems in administration of the state and development administration. Besides, the post-Soeharto era of “reform (reformasi)” demanded the complete wipeout of the Soeharto image. In contraposition to the centralization of power was decentralization. The Soeharto regime that ruled Indonesia for 32 years was established in 1966 under the banner of “anti-communism.” The end of the Cold War structure in the late 1980s undermined the legitimate reason the centralization of power to counter communism claimed by the Soeharto regime. The factor for decentralization cited by Manor is applicable here. 　　　Decentralization can be interpreted to mean not only the reversal of the centralized system of government due to its inability to respond to changes in society, as Manor points out, but also the participation of local governments in the process of the nation state building through the more positive transfer of power (democratic decentralization) and in the coordinated pursuit with the central government for a new shape of the state. However, it is also true that a variety of problems are gushing out in the process of implementing decentralization in Indonesia. 　　　This paper discusses the relationship between decentralization and the formation of the nation state with the awareness of the problems and issues described above. Section 1 retraces the history of decentralization by examining laws and regulations for local administration and how they were actually implemented or not. Section 2 focuses on the relationships among the central government, local governments, foreign companies and other actors in the play over the distribution of profits from exploitation of natural resources, and examines the process of the ulterior motives of these actors and the amplification of mistrust spawning intense conflicts that, in extreme cases, grew into separation and independence movements. Section 3 considers the merits and demerits at this stage of decentralization implemented since 2001 and shed light on the significance of decentralization in terms of the nation state building. Finally, Section 4 attempts to review decentralization as the “opportunity to learn by doing” for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state building. 　　　In the context of decentralization in Indonesia, deconcentration (dekonsentrasi), decentralization (desentralisasi) and support assignments (tugas pembantuan; medebewind, a Dutch word, was used previously) are defined as follows. Dekonsentrasi means that when the central government puts a local office of its own, or an outpost agency, in charge of implementing its service without delegating the administrative authority over this particular service. The outpost agency carries out the services as instructed by the central government. A head of a local government, when acting for the central government, gets involved in the process of dekonsentrasi. Desentralisasi, meanwhile, occurs when the central government cedes the administrative authority over a particular service to local governments. Under desentralisasi, local governments can undertake the particular service at their own discretion, and the central government, after the delegation of authority, cannot interfere with how local governments handle that service. Tugas pembantuan occur when the central government makes local governments or villages, or local governments make villages, undertake a particular service. In this case, the central government, or local governments, provides funding, equipment and materials necessary, and officials of local governments and villages undertake the service under the supervision and guidance of the central or local governments. Tugas pembantuan are maintained until local governments and villages become capable of undertaking that particular service on their own.

Vietnamese Local State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) at the Crossroads: Implications of SOE Restructuring at the Local Level

This paper aims to capture the changing features of local SOEs under the national SOE restructuring program in the 2000s. The national policy on SOE reform in this phase had an effect of considerably clarifying and narrowing down the raison d'être of SOEs, which has been put into practice at the local level through provincial master plans. Consequently, some signs of an important change are observed: the structure of the local SOE sector is being standardized to a certain extent, and the remaining local SOEs are becoming more geared to the needs of a market economy. This trend would have far-reaching implications for the policy implementation and public service delivery by localities, which in turn would affect the long-term development of non-state sectors.

The First Universal Suffrage Election, at County (Gewog) Level, in Bhutan

Following a Royal Edict to adopt universal suffrage in election for local government institutions, maiden elections were held in 199 gewogs (counties) in Bhutan in 2002 to elect their chief executives. This paper gives an account of this first time event in a country where most villagers had never seen secret ballots and poll booths. It synthesizes detailed data, mostly qualitative, collected soon after the election was over, and assesses aspects of electoral participation that His Majesty the King of Bhutan has introduced steadily to deepen democracy. Beginning with a glance at the territorial organization of the Bhutanese state within which the counties are embedded, the paper compares the electoral results with the relevant election rules.

Clusters and Innovation: Beijing's Hi-technology Industry Cluster and Guangzhou's Automobile Industry Cluster

This paper proposes a flowchart approach to the automobile industry cluster policy and the hi-technology industry cluster policy to prioritize policy measures. First, in the automobile industry cluster, suppliers of parts and components to anchor firms such as Honda, Nissan and Toyota of Japanese assembly makers in Guangzhou, China, can innovate partly because the suppliers have become independent of their anchor firms in the Japanese Keiretsu system. Second, concerning the hi-technology industry clustering in Beijing, we show that the existence of universities is a precondition for the industrial cluster policy and that the leadership of the Zhongguancun Science Park Management Committee of Beijing Municipality is crucial to the success of the industrial cluster policy. The flowchart for the hi-technology industry is different from the one for the automobile industry cluster.

The Flowchart Model of Cluster Policy: The Automobile Industry Cluster in China

This paper proposes a general model of the flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy and applies this model to Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. The flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy is an action plan for prioritizing policy measures in a time-ordered series. We reached the following two conclusions. First,we clarified the effects of Honda, Nissan, and Toyota on agglomeration in Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. Second, we established that local governments play a crucial role in successful industrial cluster policy, and that the mayor of the local government should be offered incentives in order to target industrial clustering and implement cluster policy.

Fiscal Decentralization, Chinese Style: Good for Health Outcomes?

This study analyzes the effect of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes in China using a panel data set with nationwide county-level data. We find that counties in more fiscal decentralized provinces have lower infant mortality rates compared to those counties in which the provincial government retains the main spending authority, if certain conditions are met. Spending responsibilities at the local level need to be matched with county government's own fiscal capacity. For those local governments that have only limited revenues, their ability to spend on local public goods such as health care depends crucially upon intergovernmental transfers. The findings of this study thereby support the common assertion that fiscal decentralization can indeed lead to more efficient production of local public goods, but also highlights the necessary conditions to make this happen.

Measuring Fiscal Decentralization in the Philippines

This paper focuses on the fiscal decentralization in the Philippines after the 1991 Local Government Code. It first examines the intergovernmental fiscal relationship between central and local governments by using fiscal decentralization indicators, and then investigates its impact on local finance. After fiscal decentralization, the local expenditure responsibility is expanded while the local fiscal capacity is not strengthened in the Philippines. Local governments consequently comes to depend heavily on fiscal transfers from the central government, internal revenue allotments (IRAs), which has a substantial influence on local finance. The heavy dependence on IRAs makes local finance unpredictable and unstable. The distribution of IRAs also affects the horizontal balance between provincial governments.

Trade of Heilongjiang Province (China) with Russia

Local trade between the Far East region of the USSR and the Northeast region of the People’s Republic of China started in 1957, arranged by the public trade organizations in the respective borderlands. Heilongjiang Province of China has been the main actor in trade with the Far East region of the USSR, and more recently, Russia. After 1957, Heilongjiang Province’s trade with the Russian Far East developed rapidly until 1993, except a period of interruption (1967-1982). Thereafter, the Heilongjiang Province’s trade with the Russian Far East underwent a stagnation period (1994-1998), a recovery period (1999-2001), a rapid development period (2002-2007) and a period of change of tendencies and radical decrease (2008-2009). Heilongjiang Province’s trade with the Russian Far East consists of three main forms: general trade, Chinese-style border trade (Bianjing Trade which includes Bianjing Small Trade and trade between private persons (Hushi Trade)) and Travel Trade. The rapid increase of Heilongjiang Province’s trade with the Russian Far East from 2002 to 2007 is mainly attributable to the increase in the export of ordinary consumer goods, especially textile clothing and footwear, and to Bianjing Small Trade.