Forestry Sector Reform and Distributional Change of Natural Resource Rent in Indonesia

After the collapse of the centralized Soeharto regime, deforestation caused by over-logging accelerated. To tackle this problem, an IMF/World Bank-led forestry sector reform program adopted a market-friendly approach involving the resumption of round wood exports and raising of the resource rent fee, with the aim to stop rent accumulation by plywood companies, which had enjoyed a supply of round wood at privileged prices. The Indonesian government, for its part, decentralized the forest concession management system to provide incentives for local governments and communities to carry out sustainable forest management. However, neither policy reform worked effectively. The round wood export ban was reimposed and the forest management system centralized again with cooperation from a newly funded industry-led institution. In the midst of the confusion surrounding the policy reversal, the gap between the price of round wood in international and domestic markets failed to contract, although rent allocations to plywood industries were reduced during 1998-2003. The rents were not collected properly by the government, but accumulated unexpectedly in the hands of players in the black market for round wood.

Regional differences regarding land tenancy in rural Rwanda, with special reference to sharecropping in a coffee production area

This paper examines land tenancy systems and tenant contracts in Rwanda, with respect to socioeconomic contexts. Our research in southern and eastern Rwanda produced data suggesting that land borrowing with fixed rents has been generally practiced, and that rent levels have been low in comparison to expected revenues from field production. In the western areas of coffee production, however, the practice of sharecropping has recently appeared. This system is advantageous to landowners, as they are able to acquire half of the harvests; in addition, the fixed rent levels in this region are much higher than those of other regions. In the southern and eastern regions, because land borrowing with fixed rents has been the only tenancy pattern and rent levels have remained low, the economic situation should be interpreted in the context of a continuing traditional Rwandan land tenure system. In contrast, in the western coffee production area, the soaring of fixed rents and the emergence of sharecropping have been brought about by high pressures for land use, which were caused not only by a population increase but also by the development of cash crop production and the existence of a labor exchange system. The increase in rent levels has therefore been offset by a corresponding increase in agricultural productivity.