Who Develops Innovations in Medicine for the Poor? Trends in Patent Applications Related to Medicines for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria and Neglected Diseases

Who invents medicines for the poor of the world? This question becomes very important where the WTO allows low income countries to be unbound by the TRIPS agreement. This agreement concerns medicines for infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. These diseases cause serious damage to low income countries. Under these circumstances, some scholars wonder if anyone will continue innovative activities related to treating these diseases. This paper sought to answer this question by collecting and analyzing patent data of medicines and vaccines for diseases using the database of the Japan Patent Office. Results indicate that private firms have led in innovation not only for global diseases such as HIV/AIDS but also diseases such as malaria that are spreading exclusively in low income countries. Innovation for the three infectious diseases is diverse among firms, and frequent patent applications by high-performing pharmaceutical firms appear prominent even after R&D expenditure, economies of scale, and economies of scope are taken into account.

Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.