Minority type matters : ethnic diversity and tolerance in 29 European democracies

Past research has shown that having a large population of ethnic minorities beyond the neighborhood level arouses intolerance in the majority. However, this paper presents the argument that the effect of minority size on tolerance depends on minority type: the less subject the minority is to negative stereotyping, the more favorable the effect that minority size has on tolerance. In this study, a hierarchical linear model was applied to a dataset on advanced and emerging democracies in Europe. The analysis shows that when the duration and level of democracy are controlled for, ethnic tolerance was associated positively with native minority size and negatively with foreign population size.

Firms' use of FTA schemes in exporting and importing : is there a two-way relationship?

In this paper, we examine the roles of firm size in the use of FTA schemes in exporting and importing. Also, it is investigated as to whether FTA users in importing (exporting) are more likely to use FTA schemes in exporting (importing). To do that, we employed a unique survey in which the detailed information on FTA use is available for Japanese affiliates in ASEAN. Our findings are summarized as follows. First, firm size matters in the use of FTA schemes only in exporting, not in importing. Second, the past experience of FTA use in exporting (importing) does not help firms use the FTA schemes in importing (exporting). Thus, it is necessary to assist firms to use FTA schemes in exporting even if they are already using FTA schemes in importing.

The effects of international politics on oil-exporting developing countries

International politics affects oil trade. But does it affect the oil-exporting developing countries more? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to changes in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To the extent that developing countries have higher hold-up risks because of their weaker institutions, the political effect on oil trade should be more significant in the developing world. We find that oil import decisions are indeed more elastic when firms import from developing countries, although the reverse is true in the short run. Our results suggest that international politics can affect oil revenue and hence long-term development in the developing world.