3 resultados para deliberation violations

em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies


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Since the year 2000 when the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, human trafficking has been regarded as one of the egregious violations of human rights, and global efforts have been made to eradicate it. The anti-trafficking framework has multiple dimensions, and the way the anti-trafficking framework is constructed influences its impact on the victims and non-trafficked migrants. This paper will analyze the impact of the anti-trafficking framework on the experiences of Burmese victims and non-trafficked migrants in Thailand. I will question the conventional framework of anti-trafficking, and seek to construct a framework more appropriate for addressing victims' actual needs. In conclusion, the anti-trafficking framework should serve the best interest of the victim; still, it should not be one which might adversely affect the interest of the would-be victim who is not identified as a victim according to the law.

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This paper analyzes customary practices of consensus decision making, called musyawarah-mufakat, as a basis of democratic stability in Indonesia. Musyawarah and mufakat (deliberation and consensus) are a traditional decision-making rule in Indonesia which has often been observed in village meetings. This paper argues that this traditional decision-making rule is still employed even in a modernized and democratized Indonesia, not only at rural assemblies but in the national parliament as well. Furthermore, this consensus way of decision making provides an institutional basis for democratic stability by giving every parliamentary player, whether big or small, an equal opportunity to express his/her interests. On the other hand, this system of musyawarah‐mufakat decreases political efficiency in the sense that it takes a long time to deliberate drafted laws in the parliament.

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This paper explains how the Armington-Krugman-Melitz supermodel developed by Dixon and Rimmer can be parameterized, and demonstrates that only two kinds of additional information are required in order to extend a standard trade model to include Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. Further, it is shown how specifying too much additional information leads to violations of the model constraints, necessitating adjustment and reconciliation of the data. Once a Melitz-type model is parameterized, a Krugman-type model can also be parameterized using the calibrated values in the Melitz-type model without any additional data. Sample code for the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) has also been prepared to promote the innovative supermodel in the AGE community.