Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China

In the recent decade China witnessed an upsurge of privatization of small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast to the consequent sharp reduction in the number of firms, however, the estimated share of broadly-defined SOEs that includes limited liabilities companies controlled by the State has shown virtually no sign of decline. We explain the backgrounds of this seemingly paradoxical persistence of state-ownership by looking into two distinctive types of large SOEs: traditional SOEs that remain dominant in oligopolistic industries and manager-controlled SOEs surviving in competitive industries. The two types exemplify several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs. Sorting these issues out will take time, which means that instabilities associated with state corporate ownership will remain in place in the foreseeable future in China.

Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

Chapter 7 Clusters of Modern and Local Industries in Vietnam

Since the introduction of the Doi Moi ('renovation') economic reform in 1986, Vietnam has experienced a transformation of its economic management, from a central planning economy to a market-oriented economy. High economic growth, created by the liberalization of activities in all sectors of the economy, has changed the economic structure of the country, and the once agriculture-based and poverty-stricken land now generates a midlevel income and possesses many industrial bases. Economic growth has also changed the landscape of the country. Business complexes have been built in metropolises like Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, and rice fields have been converted into industrial zones. As the number of enterprises increased, areas began to emerge where many enterprises agglomerated. Some of these 'clusters' were groups of cottage industry households, while many others were large-scale industrial clusters. As Porter [1998] argues, industrial clusters are the source of a nation's 'competitive advantage'. McCarty et al. [2005] indicate that in some key industries in Vietnam, some clusters of enterprises have been created, although the degree of agglomeration differs from one industry to another. Using industry census data from 2001, they include dot density maps for the 12 leading manufacturing industries in Vietnam. They show that most of the industries analyzed are clustered either in Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City (or both). Among these 12 industries, the garments industry has the greatest tendency to cluster, followed by textile, rice, seafood, and paper industries. The fact that industrial clusters have begun to form in some areas could be a positive sign for Vietnam's future economic development. What is lacking in McCarty et al. [2005], however, is the identification of the participants in the industrial clusters. Some argue for the importance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam's economic development (e.g. Nguyen Tri Thanh [2007], Tran Tien Cuong et al. [2008]), while others stress the impact of foreign direct investments (FDI) (for example, Tuan Bui [2009]). Adding information about the participants in the above cluster study (and in other studies of spatial patterns of location of enterprises) may broaden the scope for analysis of economic development in Vietnam. This study aims to reveal the characteristics of industrial clusters in terms of their participants and locations. The findings of the study may provide basic information for evaluating the effects of agglomeration and the robustness of the effects in the industrial clusters in Vietnam. Section 1 describes the characteristics of economic entities in Vietnam such as ownership, size of enterprise, and location. Section 2 examines qualitative aspects of industrial clusters identified in McCarty et al. [2005] and uses information on the size and ownership of clusters. Three key industries (garments, consumer electronics, and motor vehicle) are selected for the study. Section 3 identifies another type of cluster commonly seen in Vietnam, composed of local industries and called 'craft villages'. Many such villages have been developed since the early 1990s. The study points out that some of these villages have become industrialized (or are becoming industrialized) by introducing modern modes of production and by employing thousands of laborers.