Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others’ investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.

Related Lending and Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, it was confirmed that banks lend to their related parties in many countries. The question examined in this article is whether related lending functions to alleviate the problems of asymmetric information or transfers profits from depositors and minority shareholders to related parties. The effects of related lending on the profitability and risk of banks in Indonesia are examined using panel data from 1994 to 2007 comprising a total of 74 Indonesian banks. The effects on return on asset (ROA) varied at different periods. Before and right after the crisis, a higher credit allocation to related parties increased ROA. In middle of the crisis, it turned to negative; and this has also been the case in the most recent period as the Indonesian economy has normalized. Effects of related lending on bank risk measured by the Z-score and non-performing loan is not clear. After undergoing bank restructuring, related lending has decreased and the profit structure of banks has changed.

A unified framework of trade in value added : physical, monetary, exchange rates, and GHG emissions

Koopman et al. (2014) developed a method to consistently decompose gross exports in value-added terms that accommodate infinite repercussions of international and inter-sector transactions. This provides a better understanding of trade in value added in global value chains than does the conventional gross exports method, which is affected by double-counting problems. However, the new framework is based on monetary input--output (IO) tables and cannot distinguish prices from quantities; thus, it is unable to consider financial adjustments through the exchange market. In this paper, we propose a framework based on a physical IO system, characterized by its linear programming equivalent that can clarify the various complexities relevant to the existing indicators and is proved to be consistent with Koopman's results when the physical decompositions are evaluated in monetary terms. While international monetary tables are typically described in current U.S. dollars, the physical framework can elucidate the impact of price adjustments through the exchange market. An iterative procedure to calculate the exchange rates is proposed, and we also show that the physical framework is also convenient for considering indicators associated with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.