Domestic and international border effects

Previous studies in the border-effect literature surprisingly found that domestic border effects are larger than international border effects (e.g., in the United States or Brazil). One interpretation of this result is that these estimates include the effects of producer agglomeration. Therefore, in this study, we estimate those border effects exclusively for transactions for final consumption, in which such agglomeration forces will be weak, in China and Japan. As a result, we found larger international border effects and could not find a significant role for producer agglomeration in the estimates of border effects. We also found that China's accession to the World Trade Organization reduces border effects in trading between China and Japan but does not decrease domestic border effects.

Chairship system and decision making by consensus in international agreements : the case of ASEAN

How are different positions reconciled under decision making by consensus in international agreements? This article aims to answer this question. Consensus rule provides each participant a veto, which risks resulting in non-agreement. Taking ASEAN as a case study of international organizations that have adopted consensus rule as the main decision-making procedure, this article presents the chairship system as an analytical scheme to examine how different positions are or are not reconciled under consensus rule. The system is based on conventional knowledge regarding the chair in international conference, which can be defined as an institution where the role of the chair is taken by one member state in an international organization and plays a role in agenda-setting. The agenda-setting power given to the chair varies across organizations. This article assumes that the chair in ASEAN is given a relatively strong agenda-setting power to enable the chair to reach agreements and bias such agreements in its own favor.