Measuring the costs of FTA utilization : evidence from transaction-level import data of Thailand

In this study, we measure the utilization costs of free trade agreement (FTA) tariff schemes. To do that, we use shipment-level customs data on Thai imports, which identify not only firms, source country, and commodity but also tariff schemes. We propose several measures as a proxy for FTA utilization costs. The example includes the minimum amount of firm-level savings on tariff payments, i.e., trade values under FTA schemes multiplied by the tariff margin, in all transactions. Consequently, the median costs for FTA utilization in 2008, for example, are estimated to be approximately US$2,000 for exports from China, US$300 for exports from Australia, and US$1,000 for exports from Japan. We also found that FTA utilization costs differ by rule of origin and industry.

Distribution System of China's Industrial Clusters: Case Study of Yiwu China Commodity City

This paper discusses the issue of upgrading industrial clusters from the perspective of external linkages. It is taken for granted that in most developing countries, due to the limited domestic market and poor traditional commercial networks, industrial clusters are able to upgrade only when they are involved in global value chains. However, the rise of China’s industrial clusters challenges this view. Historically, China has had a lot of industrial clusters with their own traditional commercial networks. This fact combined with its huge population resulted in the formation of a unique external linage to China’s industrial clusters after the socialist planning period ended. In concrete terms, since the 1980s, a traditional commercial institution . the transaction market . began to appear in most clusters. These markets within the clusters get connected to those in the cities due to interaction between traditional merchants and local governments. This has resulted in the formation of a powerful market network-based distribution system which has played a crucial role for China’s industrial clusters in responding to exploding domestic demand. This paper explains these features in detail, using Yiwu China Commodity City as a case study.

Financial Aspects of Transactions with FDI: Trade Credit Provision by SMEs in China

This paper will document financial aspects of transactions, and trade credit supply behavior with FDI among small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) based on two original surveys, conducted in four cities in China in 2003. The survey was designed to capture the nature of inter-firm transactions, trade credit and other financial conditions. Literature on FDI mainly refers to technology transfer, employment or investment. This paper focuses on the role and significance of FDI in the supply of trade credit due to its trade credit enforcement technology. Yanagawa, Ito and Watanabe [2006] developed a model which indicates that when a seller has higher enforcement technology or a buyer has richer liquidity, both trade credit and transaction volume will be increased. In this paper, we confirmed that FDI and G contributed to the provision of trade credit and had a positive external effect on trade credit enforcement towards China’s economy. (1) Sales towards FDI customers have the power to increase the trade credit ratio,even when controlling other factors such as choice of payment instrument, competitiveness, and expost default management. This implies that FDI does provide trade credit, not only because it has superior liquidity, but because it is also superior in terms of enforcement of trade credit repayment.(2) Cash constraints of the buyer influence the decisions concerning trade credit provided by the seller, as a model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006] predicted, and this implies that strategic default is a serious concern among SMEs in China. (3) Spillover effect exists in payment enforcement technology in transactions with FDI customers.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.

Multiplant strategy under core-periphery structure

A typical implicit assumption on monopolistic competition models for trade and economic geography is that firms can produce and sell only at one place. This paper fallows endogenous determination of the number of plants in a new economic geography model and examine the stable outcomes of organization choice between single-plant and multi-plant in two regions. We explicitly consider the firms' trade-off between larger economies of scale under single plant configuration and the saving in interregional transport costs under multi-plant configuration. We show that organization change arises under decreasing transportation costs and observe several organization configurations under a generalized cost function.

Why do oil importers diversify their import sources politically? : evidence from U.S. firm-level data

International politics affects oil trade. But why? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine what kinds of firms are more responsive to change in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To test this hold-up risk hypothesis, we investigate heterogeneity in responses by matching transaction-level import data with firm-level worldwide reserves. Our results show that long-run oil import decisions are indeed more elastic for firms with oil reserves overseas than those without, although the reverse is true in the short run. We interpret this empirical regularity as that while firms trade in the spot market can adjust their imports immediately, vertically-integrated firms with investment overseas tend to commit to term contracts in the short run even though they are more responsive to changes in international politics in the long run.

Transition from black to official markets for foreign exchange in Myanmar

We address the puzzle why the black market for foreign exchange thrives in Myanmar despite the successful unification of multiple exchange rates. A closer look at the black market reveals that its enduring competitiveness stems from its lower transaction costs. A question arising from this observation is how the official market, namely banks, can compete with and replace the black market. Our empirical analysis based on an original questionnaire survey of private export firms regarding their choices of currency trading modes suggests that banks can attract exporters by exploiting the economies of scope between currency trading and lending.

Stability of complementarity between Japanese FDI and import of intermediate goods : agglomeration effects and parent-firm heterogeneity

This paper examines the duration of intermediate goods imports and its determinants for Japanese affiliates in China. Our estimations, using a unique parent-affiliate-transaction matched panel dataset for a discrete-time hazard model over the 2000–2006 period, reveal that products with a higher upstreamness index, differentiated goods, and goods traded under processing trade are less likely to be substituted with local procurement. Firms located in more agglomerated regions with more foreign affiliates tend to shorten the duration of imports from the home country. For parent-firm characteristics, multinational enterprises that have many foreign affiliates or longer foreign production experience import intermediate goods for a longer duration.

Does market upgrading benefit farmers? : market differentiation, contract farming, and professional cooperatives in China's pork processing industry

This study tested whether contract farming or farmers professional cooperatives (FPCs) improved the social benefit of pork production and income of breeding farmers in China. The main concern of this study is whether institutional arrangement like contract farming or FPCs actually improved the welfare of farmers as expected. To answer this question accurately, we estimated the differentiated market demand of pork products in order to quantify the benefit by transaction types. Our study finds that contract farming or FPCs improved the benefits of pork products, but farmer's income remained lower than that of traditional transaction types. This finding is new in terms of quantifying distribution of the economic values among sales outlets, agro-firms and farmers. It is more reliable because it explicitly captures impacts from both demand side and supply side by structural estimation. In practice, we need to keep it mind the bargaining power of small farmers will not improve instantly even when the contract farming or FPCs are introduced.