Understanding traders' regional arbitage : the case of rice traders in Antananarivo, Madagascar

Many studies find that agricultural markets in developing countries are poorly integrated spatially. Traders' regional arbitrage plays a key role in integrating markets across space. We investigate the performance of regional arbitrage and the associated obstacles for rice traders in Antananarivo, Madagascar. On the basis of a trader-level biweekly survey spanning 2012–2013, we find that traders are not fully exploiting the regional arbitrage opportunities: most of them fail to purchase from the cheapest district and are paying higher prices than those in the cheapest district. One apparent obstacle is obtaining price information from many different regions. To reduce search costs, we provided regional price information via SMS to randomly selected traders, but found that this had a null-effect on improving arbitrage performance. Traders tend to concentrate on trading with a few fixed districts, even if they are informed about cheaper prices in other new districts, because they worry about quality uncertainty and the trustworthiness of new partners. These findings suggest that not only transmission of price information but also issues related to produce quality and matching prevent the performance of arbitrage and market integration.

NEW ROLE OF COOPERATIVES IN ETHIOPIA: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIAN COFFEE FARMERS COOPERATIVES

Since 1991, policies of economic liberalization in Ethiopia have been effective in releasing the economy from rigid state control. At the same time, they have also exposed Ethiopian people to domestic and international free market competition. In African countries, the retreat of governments from rural development due to economic liberalization policies has led to the re-evaluation of the role of cooperatives. Since 1999, in Ethiopia, several coffee farmers cooperative unions have been established to support peasants who are handicapped by their lack of negotiating power in the global economy. Coffee cooperatives have become market-oriented and are now relatively democratic compared to the former Marxist cooperatives of the previous regime. Thus far, these coffee cooperatives have provided higher profits to coffee farmers than have private traders. The actual volume of purchase, however, is limited　due to financial constraints. Because of this, the majority of cooperatives continues to rely on conventional marketing channels rather than on unions. Considering their weak financial condition, it is too early to judge the sustainability of the cooperatives because international prices have been high recently, and it is not yet clear how they would survive a downward international price trend.

Trade policies and trade mis-reporting in Myanmar

While the trade statistics of Myanmar show surpluses for 2007 through 2010, the corresponding statistics of trade partner countries indicate deficits. Such discrepancies in mirror trade statistics are analyzed in connection with the ‘export-first and import-second’ policy provisioning import permissions on permission applicants possessing a sufficient amount of the export-tax-deducted export earnings. Under this policy, the recorded imports and exports of the private sector have been maintaining equilibrium, whereas discrepancies in the mirror statistics have fluctuated. This suggests that traders adjusted mis-reporting in accordance with the supply and demand of the export earnings.

Political influence in commercial and financial oil trading : the evidence from US firms

International politics affects oil trade. But do financial and commercial traders who participate in spot oil trading also respond to changes in international politics? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to increases in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. However, the political pattern of oil imports is not entirely driven by the concerns of hold-up risks, which exist when oil transactions via term contracts are associated with backward vertical FDI that is subject to expropriation. In particular, our results indicate that even financial and commercial traders significantly reduce their oil imports from U.S. political enemies. Interestingly, while these traders diversify their oil imports politically immediately after changes in international politics, other oil companies reduce their oil imports with a significant time lag. Our findings suggest that in designing regulations to avoid harmful repercussions on commodity and financial assets, policymakers need to understand the nature of political risk.