7 resultados para Time-Consistent Policy
em Academic Research Repository at Institute of Developing Economies
Resumo:
This paper proposes a general model of the flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy and applies this model to Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. The flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy is an action plan for prioritizing policy measures in a time-ordered series. We reached the following two conclusions. First,we clarified the effects of Honda, Nissan, and Toyota on agglomeration in Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. Second, we established that local governments play a crucial role in successful industrial cluster policy, and that the mayor of the local government should be offered incentives in order to target industrial clustering and implement cluster policy.
Resumo:
Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.
Resumo:
This paper empirically analyzes India’s monetary policy reaction function by applying the Taylor (1993) rule and its open-economy version which employs dynamic OLS. The analysis uses monthly data from the period of April 1998 to December 2007. When the simple Taylor rule was estimated for India, the output gap coefficient was statistically significant, and its sign condition was found to be consistent with theoretical rationale; however, the same was not true of the inflation coefficient. When the Taylor rule with exchange rate was estimated, the coefficients of output gap and exchange rate had statistical significance with the expected signs, whereas the results of inflation remained the same as before. Therefore, the inflation rate has not played a role in the conduct of India’s monetary policy, and it is inappropriate for India to adopt an inflation-target type policy framework.
Resumo:
Geographic distance is a standard proxy for transport costs under the simple assumption that freight fees increase monotonically over space. Using the Japanese Census of Logistics, this paper examines the extent to which transport distance and time affect freight costs across shipping modes, commodity groups, and prefecture pairs. The results show substantial heterogeneity in transport costs and time across shipping modes. Consistent with an iceberg formulation of transport costs, distance has a significantly positive effect on freight costs by air transportation. However, I find the puzzling results that business enterprises are likely to pay more for short-distance shipments by truck, ship, and railroad transportation. As a plausible explanation, I discuss aggregation bias arising from freight-specific premiums for timely, frequent, and small-batch shipments.
Resumo:
The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.
Resumo:
This paper offers a brief analysis of the legal aspects of the ethnic return migration policy of Kazakhstan, a post-Soviet Central Asian state that has been active in seeking ties with its diaspora since independence. This paper examines the definition of oralman (repatriates) and the establishment of a quota on the number of Kazakh immigrants who are eligible for government funds to show how the rationale and preferences in repatriation policy have changed over the years. By focusing on changes in migration-related legislation in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the paper notes that two key goals of Kazakhstan’s migration policy are not necessarily consistent with each other: the promotion of an ethnically based nation-building project by encouraging the "return" of co-ethnics living abroad, and building a workforce that is best suited for the development of the state’s economy.
Resumo:
International politics affects oil trade. But do financial and commercial traders who participate in spot oil trading also respond to changes in international politics? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to increases in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. However, the political pattern of oil imports is not entirely driven by the concerns of hold-up risks, which exist when oil transactions via term contracts are associated with backward vertical FDI that is subject to expropriation. In particular, our results indicate that even financial and commercial traders significantly reduce their oil imports from U.S. political enemies. Interestingly, while these traders diversify their oil imports politically immediately after changes in international politics, other oil companies reduce their oil imports with a significant time lag. Our findings suggest that in designing regulations to avoid harmful repercussions on commodity and financial assets, policymakers need to understand the nature of political risk.