Evolution in the Concept of Development: How Has The World Bank's Legal Assistance Extended its Reach?

The World Bank's legal and judicial reforms programs have expanded considerably since it began to address the issue of governance in the early 1990s. Initially the Bank focused on legal reforms for inducing private investment. Currently, its legal assistance extends to include the criminal justice sector. Such activities cannot be directly construed from its Articles of Agreement. This paper will discuss how the Bank interpreted its Articles in order to ligitimize its expanding activities. The Bank has manoeuvred itself into the criminal justice sector by skillfully changing its concept of development without deviating from its mandate. The change can be described as an 'evolution' which has allowed the Bank to identify any area as target for its development assistance.

The Central Bank and bank credits in the Philippines : a survey on effectiveness of monetary policy and its measures

In the post-Asian crisis period, bank loans to the manufacturing sector have shown a slow recovery in the affected countries, unexceptionally in the Philippines. This paper provides a literacy survey on the effectiveness of the Central Bank’s monetary policy and the responsiveness of the financial market, and discusses on the future works necessary to better understand the monetary policy effectiveness in the Philippines. As the survey shows, most previous works focus on the correlation between the short-term policy rates and during the period of monetary tightening and relatively less interest in quantitative effectiveness. Future tasks would shed lights on (1) the asset side – other than loan outstanding – of banks to analyze their behavior/preference in structuring portfolios, and (2) the quantitative impacts during the monetary easing period.

Bank restructuring and financial institution reform in Indonesia

The banking sector underwent drastic reform in post-crisis Indonesia. Bank restructuring, driven by IMF conditionalities, resulted in the exit of insolvent banks and ownership changes of major private banks. Through recapitalization and sales of government-held shares, foreign-owned banks emerged as leading actors in the place of business-group-affiliated banks. As part of the restructuring process, an exit rule was created. The central bank, which up to that time had been given only partial authority under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance, now gained a full range of authority over banks. The central bank's supervision system on banks, risk management systems at individual banks, and their efforts to build risk management capacities, began to function. This is totally different from the old financial institution under the Soeharto regime, where banks had no incentive to control risks, as the regime tacitly ensured their survival.

Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others’ investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Malaysia before the Asian Crisis

This paper provides a case study to characterize the monetary policy regime in Malaysia, from a medium- and long-term perspective. Specifically, we ask how the central bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), has structured its monetary policy regime, and how it has conducted monetary and exchange rate policy under the regime. By conducting three empirical analyses, we characterize the monetary and exchange rate policy regime in Malaysia by three intermediate solutions on three vectors: the degree of autonomy in monetary policy, the degree of variability of the exchange rate, and the degree of capital mobility.

Industrialization in Indonesia since the 1970s

Introduction: During the period from the latter half of the 1980s until just before the Asian currency crisis in 1997, Indonesia’s economic development had drawn expectations and attention from various quarters, along with Malaysia and Thailand within the same Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In fact, the 1993 report by the World Bank, entitled “East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,” recognized Indonesia as one of the East Asian economies with the strong economic performance, i.e. sustained economic growth (World Bank [1993]). And it was the manufacturing industry that had been the driving force behind Indonesia’s economic growth during that period. Since the 1997 outbreak of the Asian currency crisis, however, the manufacturing sector in Indonesia has been mired in a situation that rules out the kind of bright prospects it had emanated previously. The Indonesian economy is still in the developing stage, and in accordance with the history of industrial structural changes in other countries, Indonesia’s manufacturing industry can still be expected to serve as the engine of the country’s economic development. But is it really possible in an environment where economic liberalization and globalization are forging ahead? And, what sort of problems have to be dealt with to make it possible? To answer these questions, it is necessary to know the current conditions of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, and to do that, it becomes important to think back on the history of the country’s industrialization. Thus, this paper is intended to retrace and unlock the track of Indonesia’s industrialization up until the establishment of the manufacturing sector in its present form, with the ultimate goal being to give answers to the above-mentioned questions. Subject to an analysis in this paper is the period from the installment of President Soeharto’s administration onward when industrialization of the modern industrial sector2 moved into high gear. 　　　The composition of this paper is outlined below. Section 1 first shows why it is important to examine import substitution and export orientation, both of which are used as the measures of the analysis in this paper, in tracking the history of the industrialization, and then discuss indicators of import substitution and export orientation as well as statistical data and resources needed to develop those indicators. Section 2 clarifies the status of the manufacturing industry among all industries by looking at the composition ratio of the manufacturing industry in terms of value added, imports and exports. Section 3 to 5 cover three periods between 1971 and 1995 and make an analysis of import substitution, export orientation and changes in the industrial structure for each period. Section 3 analyzes the period from 1971 through 1985, when Indonesia pursued the import substitution policy amid the oil boom. Section 4 covers the period from 1985 through 1990, when the packages of deregulatory measures were announced successively under structural adjustment policies made necessary by the fall in oil prices. Section 5 examines the period from 1990 through 1995, which saw the alternate shifts between the overheating of the economy by sharply rising investment by both domestic and foreign investors in the wake of the liberalization of investment, trade and financial services, and polices to cool down the economy. Section 6, which covers the 1995-1999 period straddling the economic crisis, is designed for an analysis of the changes in production trends before and after the economic crisis as well as the changes in the industrial structure. Section 7, after summing up the history of Indonesia’s industrialization examined in the previous sections, discusses problems found in respective sectors and attempts to present future prospects for the country’s manufacturing industry.

Transformation of the Financial Sector in Indonesia

Introduction : The source and deployment of finance are central issues in economic development. Since 1966, when the Soeharto Administration was inaugurated, Indonesian economic development has relied on funds in the form of aid from international organizations and foreign countries. After the 1990s, a further abundant inflow of capital sustained a rapid economic development. Foreign funding was the basis of Indonesian economic growth. This paper will describe the mechanism for allocating funds in the Indonesian economy. It will identify the problems this mechanism generated in the Indonesian experience, and it will attempt to explain why there was a collapse of the financial system in the wake of the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. History of the Indonesian Financial system The year 1966 saw the emergence of commercial banks in Indonesia. It can be said that before 1966 a financial system hardly existed, a fact commonly attributed to economic disruptions like the consecutive runs of fiscal deficit and hyperinflation under the Soekarno Administration. After 1996, with the inauguration of Soeharto, a regulatory system of financial legislation, e.g. central banking law and banking regulation, was introduced and implemented, and the banking sector that is the basis of the current financial system in Indonesia was built up. 　　　The Indonesian financial structure was significantly altered at the first financial reform of 1983. Between 1966 and 1982, the banking sector consisted of Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank) and the state-owned banks. There was also a system for distributing the abundant public revenue derived from the soaring oil price of the 1970s. The public finance distribution function, incorporated in Indonesian financial system, changed after the successive financial reforms of 1983 and 1988, when there was a move away from the monopoly-market style dominated by state-owned banks (which was a system of public finance distribution that operated at the discretion of the government) towards a modern market mechanism. The five phases of development The Indonesian financial system developed in five phases between 1966 and the present time. The first period (1966-72) was its formative period, the second (1973-82) its policy based finance period under soaring oil prices, the third (1983-91) its financial-reform period, the fourth (1992-97) its period of expansion, and the fifth (1998-) its period of financial restructuring. The first section of this paper summarizes the financial policies operative during each of the periods identified above. In the second section changes to the financial sector in response to policies are examined, and an analysis of these changes shows that an important development of the financial sector occurred during the financial reform period. In the third section the focus of analysis shifts from the general financial sector to particular commercial banks’ performances. In the third section changes in commercial banks’ lending and fund-raising behaviour after the 1990s are analysed by comparing several banking groups in terms of their ownership and foundation time. The last section summarizes the foregoing analyses and examines the problems that remain in the Indonesian financial sector, which is still undergoing restructuring.

Impacts of foreign exchange auctions on the informal market rate in Myanmar

Since the abolition of the official peg and the introduction of a managed float in April 2012, the Central Bank of Myanmar has operated the daily two–way auctions of foreign exchange aimed at smoothing exchange rate fluctuations. Despite the reforms to the foreign exchange regime, however, informal trading of foreign exchange remains pervasive. Using the daily informal exchange rate and Central Bank auction data, this study examines the impacts of auctions on the informal market rate. First, a VAR analysis indicates that the official rate did not Granger cause the informal rate. Second, GARCH models indicate that the auctions did not reduce the conditional variance of the informal rate returns. Overall, the auctions have only a quite modest impact on the informal exchange rate.

Asset composition of the Philippines' universal and commercial banks : monetary policy or self-discipline?

The central bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BSP) has improved its monetary policy measures since the 2000s. After rationalizing the country's banking sector since late-1990s, its monetary policy and the uniiversal/commercial banks' (UCBs) behavior in allocating their assets has changed since mid-2000s. Though further and more detailed studies are nesessary, based on the results of simple correlation analyses conducted in this paper suggest a possible mixture of the country's monetary policy and their own decision-making in asset allocations, instead of a "follow-through" attitude.

Inter-industry analysis and monetary policy evaluations in the Korean flow of funds accounts

This study mainly aims to provide an inter-industry analysis through the subdivision of various industries in flow of funds (FOF) accounts. Combined with the Financial Statement Analysis data from 2004 and 2005, the Korean FOF accounts are reconstructed to form "from-whom-to-whom" basis FOF tables, which are composed of 115 institutional sectors and correspond to tables and techniques of input–output (I–O) analysis. First, power of dispersion indices are obtained by applying the I–O analysis method. Most service and IT industries, construction, and light industries in manufacturing are included in the first quadrant group, whereas heavy and chemical industries are placed in the fourth quadrant since their power indices in the asset-oriented system are comparatively smaller than those of other institutional sectors. Second, investments and savings, which are induced by the central bank, are calculated for monetary policy evaluations. Industries are bifurcated into two groups to compare their features. The first group refers to industries whose power of dispersion in the asset-oriented system is greater than 1, whereas the second group indicates that their index is less than 1. We found that the net induced investments (NII)–total liabilities ratios of the first group show levels half those of the second group since the former's induced savings are obviously greater than the latter.