The gap between recognition and the 'compensation business' : the claim against Britain for compensation by Kenya's former Mau Mau fighters

During the first Kibaki administration (2002-2007), a movement by the former Mau Mau fighters demanded recognition for the role that they had played in the achievement of independence. They began to demand, also, monetary compensation for past injustices. Why had it taken over 40 years (from independence in 1963) for the former Mau Mau fighters to initiate this movement? What can be observed as the outcome of their movement? To answer these questions, three different historical currents need to be taken into account. These were, respectively, changing trends in the government of Kenya, progress in historical research into the actual circumstances of colonial control, and a realization, based on mounting experience, that launching a legal action against Britain could turn out to be a lucrative initiative. This paper concludes that, regardless of the actual purpose of the legal case, neither of their objectives was certain to be achieved. Two inescapable realities remain: the doubts cast on the reputation of the government by its decision to lift the Mau Mau‟s outlaw status – a decision that was widely seen as a latter-day example of the „Kikuyu favouritism‟ policy followed by the first Kibaki administration – and the popular interpretation of the involvement of Leigh Day, well known in Kenya ever since the unexploded bombs case for its success in obtaining substantial compensation payments, as a vehicle for squeezing large amounts of money from the British government for the benefit of the Kikuyu people.

Value Chain Dynamics and Growth of Local Firms:The Case of Motorcycle Industry in Vietnam

Vietnam’s burgeoning market for motorcycles has attracted global industry eaders,players from developing countries, and local firms. This has led to a dynamic evolution of value chains. This paper presents an explanation of the varieties of the growth patterns xperienced by the local suppliers, focusing on the roles of customer and local supplier strategies. Case studies showed that while the role of customers may be important, strategies of suppliers to improve the ompetitive edge in the production of otorcycle components and to diversify into other products account for important ariations of growth trajectories among local suppliers. Findings presented in this paper suggest the need to direct more attention to strategy that local firms use to boost their competitive edge in business.

Chapter 6 Economic integration and changes in industrial location in Vietnam

Vietnam has been praised for its achievements in economic growth and success in poverty reduction over the last two decades. The incidence of poverty reportedly fell from 58.1% in 1993 to 19.5% in 2004 (VASS [2006, 13]). The country is also considered to have only a moderate level of aggregate economic inequality by international comparisons. As of the early 2000s, Vietnam’s consumption-based Gini coefficient is found to be comparable to that of other countries with similar levels of per capita GDP. The Gini index did increase between 1993 and 2004, but rather slowly, from 0.34 to 0.37 (VASS [2006, 13]). Yet, as the country moves on with its market oriented reforms, the question of inequality has been highlighted in policy and academic discourses. In particular, it is pointed out that socio-economic inequalities between regions (or provinces) are significant and have been widening behind aggregate figures (NCSSH [2001], Mekong Economics [2005], VASS [2006]). Between 1993 and 2004, while real per capita expenditure increased in all regions, it grew fastest in those regions with the highest per capita expenditures and vice versa, resulting in greater regional disparities (VASS [2006, 37]). A major contributing factor to such regional inequalities is the uneven distribution of industry within the country. According to the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam, of the country's gross industrial output in 2007, over 50% belongs to the South East region, close to 25% to the Red River Delta, and about 10% to the Mekong River Delta. All remaining regions share some 10% of the country's gross industrial output. At a quick glance, the South East increased its share of the total industrial gross output in the 1990s, while the Red River Delta started to gain ground in more recent years. How can the government deal with regional disparities is a valid question. In order to offer an answer, it is necessary in the first place to grasp the trend of disparities as well as its background. To that end, this paper is a preparatory endeavor. Regional disparities in industrial activities can essentially be seen as a result of the location decisions of enterprises. While the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam has conducted one enterprise census (followed by annual enterprise surveys) and two stages of establishment censuses since 2000, sectorally and geographically disaggregated data are not readily available. Therefore, for the moment, we will draw on earlier studies of industrial location and the determinants of enterprises’ location decisions in Vietnam. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following two sections deal with the country context. Section 2 will outline some major developments in Vietnam’s international economic relations that may affect sub-national location of industry. According to the theory of spatial economics, economic integration is seen as a major driver of changes in industrial location, both between and within countries (Nishikimi [2008]). Section 3, on the other hand, will consider some possible factors affecting geographic distribution of industry in the domestic sphere. In Section 4, existing literature on industrial and firm location will be examined, and Section 5 will briefly summarize the findings and suggest some areas for future research.

The business management strategy of Iran's large apparel firms : overview of results from a questionnaire survey and interviews 2009-2011

This paper is an overview of the results from a questionnaire survey and subsequent supplementary interviews of Iran's large apparel firms conducted by the author in 2009-2011. Most of the large apparel firms in Iran are based in Tehran and have been in business for some twenty years. They have a solid business with regular customers, but in general have hesitated to expand the size of their firms. Following the relaxation of restrictions on the procurement of raw materials that existed in the 1990s, the results of survey and interviews show that the firms have developed new channels of procurement although they depend to a considerable degree on imported raw materials and machinery. They have managed to maintain their level of output even with the rapid increase in imports since 2000, although the number of firms has decreased. Low-priced Chinese products have basically not been their rivals; instead, the inflow of foreign name-brand products have hit them heavily.

The misconception of political lessons : how UMNO perceives the fall of LDP in Japan

2012 marks the thirtieth anniversary of Malaysia’s Look East Policy (LEP). This article argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is stimulated by symbiotic ties binding together both countries’ respective major political parties, viz. the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), derived political lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. Two forms of lessons may be discerned. First, emulation of Japan’s success in economic development, which become the basis of LEP launched in 1981. Second, on which our article focuses, lessons from the failure of LDP to retain power twice in 1993 and 2009. Since 1993, DP’s defeat has been a poignant reminder for UMNO to be in alert mode in facing any electoral possibility. When LDP was again ousted from power in 2009, UMNO was a most psychologically affected party owing to the unprecedented setback it suffered at Malaysia’s Twelfth General Elections (GE) of 2008. Yet, although LDP’s reversal of fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1999, the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogising between different situations which at a glance seem to be comparable.