Myanmar and Japan: How Close Friends Become Estranged

Independent Myanmar and Japan had long held the strongest ties among Asian countries, and they were often known as having "special relations" or a "historically friendly relationship." Such relations were guaranteed by the sentiments and experiences of the leaders of both countries. Among others, Ne Win, former strongman throughout the socialist period (1962-1988), was educated and trained by the Japanese army officers of the Minami Kikan, leading to the birth of the Burma Independence Army (BIA). Huge official development assistance provided by the Japanese government also cemented this special relationship. However, the birth of the present military government (SLORC/SPDC) in 1988 drastically changed this favorable relationship between the two countries. When the military seized power in a coup, Japan was believed to be the only country that possessed sufficient meaningful influence on Myanmar to encourage a move toward national reconciliation between the junta and the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi. In reality, Japan failed to exert such an influence due to its sour relations with the military government and reduced influence in the new international and regional political landscape. What is worse, Japan seems to be losing its say on Myanmar issues in the international political arena, as it has been wavering in limbo between the sanctionist forces, such as the United States and the European Union, and engagement forces, such as China and ASEAN.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.