Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.

Theoretical Models Based on a Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster Policy

This article examined the issue of whether or not the currency exchange rate, country risk, and cooperate tax rate affect decisions of multinational firms to invest in industrial clusters. First, if the exchange rate between a multinational company in an industry of diminishing returns to scale and a developing country is appreciated, then production in the developing country should increase. Second, if the investment period becomes longer, the currency exchange rate of a multinational company's country should be revalued more in order for it to further invest in the developing country. Third, if the investment period becomes longer, the developing country's risk should become less. Fourth, compensation for the developing country's high risk can be made by lowering its corporate tax rate.

Vertical specialisation indicator based on supply-driven input-output model

“Import content of exports”, based on Leontief’s demand-driven input-output model, has been widely used as an indicator to measure a country’s degree of participation in vertical specialisation trade. At a sectoral level, this indicator represents the share of inter-mediates imported by all sectors embodied in a given sector’s exported output. However, this indicator only reflects one aspect of vertical specialisation – the demand side. This paper discusses the possibility of using the input-output model developed by Ghosh to measure the vertical specialisation from the perspective of the supply side. At a sector level, the Ghosh type indicator measures the share of imported intermediates used in a sector’s production that are subsequently embodied in exports by all sectors. We estimate these two indicators of vertical specialisation for 47 selected economies for 1995, 2000, 2005 using the OECD’s harmonized input-output database. In addition, the potential biases of both indicators due to the treatment of net withdrawals in inventories, are also discussed.

The gap between recognition and the 'compensation business' : the claim against Britain for compensation by Kenya's former Mau Mau fighters

During the first Kibaki administration (2002-2007), a movement by the former Mau Mau fighters demanded recognition for the role that they had played in the achievement of independence. They began to demand, also, monetary compensation for past injustices. Why had it taken over 40 years (from independence in 1963) for the former Mau Mau fighters to initiate this movement? What can be observed as the outcome of their movement? To answer these questions, three different historical currents need to be taken into account. These were, respectively, changing trends in the government of Kenya, progress in historical research into the actual circumstances of colonial control, and a realization, based on mounting experience, that launching a legal action against Britain could turn out to be a lucrative initiative. This paper concludes that, regardless of the actual purpose of the legal case, neither of their objectives was certain to be achieved. Two inescapable realities remain: the doubts cast on the reputation of the government by its decision to lift the Mau Mau‟s outlaw status – a decision that was widely seen as a latter-day example of the „Kikuyu favouritism‟ policy followed by the first Kibaki administration – and the popular interpretation of the involvement of Leigh Day, well known in Kenya ever since the unexploded bombs case for its success in obtaining substantial compensation payments, as a vehicle for squeezing large amounts of money from the British government for the benefit of the Kikuyu people.