Crowding-out and Crowding-in Effects of Government Bonds Market on Private Sector Investment (Japanese Case Study)

This paper reviews the relationship between public sector investment and private sector investment through government expenditures financed by government bonds in the Japanese economy. This study hypothesizes that deficit financing by bond issues does not crowd out private sector investment, and this finance method may crowd in. Thus the government increases bond issues and sells them in the domestic and international financial markets. This method does not affect interest rates because they are insensitive to government expenditures and they depend on interest rates levels in the international financial market more than in the domestic financial market because of globalization and integration among financial markets.

Determinants of government consumption expenditure in developing countries : a panel data analysis

The paper focuses on the recent pattern of government consumption expenditure in developing countries and estimates the determinants which have influenced government expenditure. Using a panel data set for 111 developing countries from 1984 to 2004, this study finds evidence that political and institutional variables as well as governance variables significantly influence government expenditure. Among other results, the paper finds new evidence of Wagner's law which states that peoples' demand for service and willingness to pay is income-elastic hence the expansion of public economy is influenced by the greater economic affluence of a nation (Cameron1978). Corruption is found to be influential in explaining the public expenditure of developing countries. On the contrary, size of the economy and fractionalization are found to have significant negative association with government expenditure. In addition, the study finds evidence that public expenditure significantly shrinks under military dictatorship compared with other form of governance.

Changing local elite selection in Thailand : emergence of new local government presidents after direct elections and their capabilities

Before rural local government units were established in Thailand, reform debates within the country faced a crucial issue: Candidates at the rural sub-district levels might adopt electioneering methods such as vote buying and the patronage system of the local political and economic elite, the methods that had been used in the national elections. In fact, the results of the 2006 survey in this paper, which followed the introduction of direct elections in rural local government units in 2003, contrast with the result anticipated during the debates on political reform. The preliminary data of the survey shows that the decentralization process and the introduction of the direct election system in the rural areas had some effect in changing the selection process of the local elite in Thailand.