Bank restructuring and financial institution reform in Indonesia

The banking sector underwent drastic reform in post-crisis Indonesia. Bank restructuring, driven by IMF conditionalities, resulted in the exit of insolvent banks and ownership changes of major private banks. Through recapitalization and sales of government-held shares, foreign-owned banks emerged as leading actors in the place of business-group-affiliated banks. As part of the restructuring process, an exit rule was created. The central bank, which up to that time had been given only partial authority under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance, now gained a full range of authority over banks. The central bank's supervision system on banks, risk management systems at individual banks, and their efforts to build risk management capacities, began to function. This is totally different from the old financial institution under the Soeharto regime, where banks had no incentive to control risks, as the regime tacitly ensured their survival.

Economic restructuring and regional distrubution of enterprises in Vietnam

The change in the ownership structure of enterprises was one of the major features of the Vietnamese economy in the 2000s. Of the three sectors of state, private and FDI, the state sector, which employed the majority of enterprise workers at the beginning of the 2000s, became the smallest by the end of the decade. One of the factors contributing to such phenomenon was SOE restructuring. Earlier SOE restructuring in the early 1990s is said to have resulted in increased economic inequality among provinces. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the impact of the SOE restructuring and related changes in the ownership structure of enterprises on the regional distribution of economic activities in the 2000s.

Myanmar's two decades of partial transition to a market economy : a negative legacy for the new government

Despite more than two decades of transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy, Myanmar’s economic transition is still only partly complete. The government’s initial strategy for dealing with the swelling deficits of the state economic enterprises (SEEs) was to put them under direct control in order to scrutinize their expenditures. This policy change postponed restructuring and exacerbated the soft budget constraint problem of the SEEs. While the installation of a new government in March 2011 has increased prospects for economic development, sustainable growth still requires full-scale structural reform of the SEEs and institutional infrastructure building. Myanmar can learn from the gradual approaches to economic transition in China and Vietnam, where partial reforms weakened further impetus for reforms.

The Iron and Steel Industry in Asia: Development and Restructuring

The paper examines the development and restructuring of the iron and steel industry in Asian countries. Studying countries that have integrated steelworks with large blast furnaces (South Korea, Taiwan, China and India) and countries without (Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia), the paper shows the difference in the development processes across the countries and across time, and points to the diversity of the development experience of these countries. The paper argues that significant differences in steel production technologies in terms of initial investment and minimum-efficient scale, the changing role of the state, and shifting demand structures in the domestic steel markets of each country have been the important factors that led to the differences in the development path of the steel industry in each country.

Restructuring the state budget system for disinflation and exchange rate unification in Myanmar

The installment of a new government has augmented the prospect for implementing disinflation and exchange rate unification in Myanmar. A close look at the state budget shows that the reform of the budget system for state economic enterprises (SEEs) is essential. Reforms need to hold the replacement of controlled prices including the official exchange rate with market prices in SEE operations, and the separation of the SEEs from the state budget. But separating the SEEs from the state budget will necessitate careful planning to cope with SEE bankruptcies which would imposes another fiscal burden on the government. Therefore, economic viability must be a criterion for the continuation of their operations.