Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.

A two-dimensional analysis of the impact of outward FDI on performance at home: evidence from Japanese manufacturing firms

This paper empirically investigates two areas of changes in firm behavior and performance at home before and after investing abroad. The first change is dependent upon the type of foreign direct investment (FDI): horizontal FDI or vertical FDI. The second change is dependent upon the firm’s domestic activities: production activities or non-production activities. From a theoretical standpoint, the impact of outward FDIs differs not only by type, but according to the firm’s activities. By exploiting two types of firm-level data that enable us to distinguish between production and non-production activities, our paper provides a detailed picture of the intra-firm changes in behavior and performance that occur as a result of production globalization.

Simulation analysis of the EU ELV/RoHS directives based on an applied general equilibrium model with Melitz-type trade specification

This paper explores the potential usefulness of an AGE model with the Melitz-type trade specification to assess economic effects of technical regulations, taking the case of the EU ELV/RoHS directives as an example. Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) raising the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings results that exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and electronic equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions/countries expand while the domestic trade in the EU shrinks when the importer's preference for variety (PfV) is not strong; (2) if the PfV is not strong, policy changes that may bring reduction in the number of firms enable survived producers with high productivity to expand production to be large-scale mass producers fully enjoying the fruit of economies of scale; and (3) When the strength of the importer's PfV is changed from zero to unity, there is the value that totally changes simulation results and their interpretations.