How does contract design affect the uptake of microcredit among the ultra-poor? : experimental evidence from the river islands of Northern Bangladesh

Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of dwellers could be categorized as ultra-poor due to cyclic floods. We randomly offered four types of loans to such dwellers: regular small cash loans with one-year maturity, large cash loans with three-year maturity both with and without a one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock loans with three-year maturity and a one-year grace period. We compared uptake rates as well as the determinants of uptake and found that the uptake rate is the lowest for the regular contract, followed by the in-kind contract. Contrary to prior belief, we also found that the microcredit demand by the ultra-poor is not necessarily small, and in particular the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join a microcredit program than the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to a large amount of credit, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind. This paper provides evidence that a typical microcredit contract with one-year maturity and without a grace period is not attractive to the ultra-poor. Microfinance institutions may need to design better credit contracts to address the poor's needs.

Energy efficiency standard and labeling program and consumer welfare : a case of the air conditioner market in China

Improving energy efficiency is an unarguable emergent issue in developing economies and an energy efficiency standard and labeling program is an ideal mechanism to achieve this target. However, there is concern regarding whether the consumers will choose the highly energy efficient appliances because of its high price in consequence of the high cost. This paper estimates how the consumer responds to introduction of the energy efficiency standard and labeling program in China. To quantify evaluation by consumers, we estimated their consumer surplus and the benefits of products based on the estimated parameters of demand function. We found the following points. First, evaluation of energy efficiency labeling by the consumer is not monotonically correlated with the number of grades. The highest efficiency label (Label 1) is not evaluated to be no less higher than labels 2 and 3, and is sometimes lower than the least energy efficient label (Label UI). This goes against the design of policy intervention. Second, several governmental policies affects in mixed directions: the subsidies for energy saving policies to the highest degree of the labels contribute to expanding consumer welfare as the program was designed. However, the replacement for new appliances policies decreased the welfare.