Interaction of powers in the Philippine presidential system

The executive - legislative relations in the Philippines have been described in two contrasting stories, namely the "strong president" story, and the "strong congress" story. This paper tries to consolidate the existing arguments and propose a new perspective focusing on the "compromise exchange" between the president and the congress across the different policy areas. It considers that the policy outcome is not brought by unilateral power of the president or the congress, but formed as the product of such an exchange. Interaction of powers and their complementary function are addressed. Furthermore, aside from the constitutional power, the weak party discipline is pointed out as a key factor in making the exchange possible.

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.

The Sandinista Revolution and Post-Conflict Development--Key Issues

Following Daniel Ortega's victory in the presidential election held in November 2006, Nicaragua has been undergoing a transition from a democratic to authoritarian system. In the 1980s, Ortega served as President of the Sandinista government and implemented a Cuban-type socialist system, but the system failed and democracy was established during 1990-2007. Considering this failure, why did Ortega succeed in taking power again? This paper provides a brief history of modern Nicaragua and gives some insights into the twists of Latin American politics. The paper was prepared for the international seminar on Helping Failed States Recover: The Role of Business in Promoting Stability and Development, organized by the University of Kansas Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER), held on April 4-6, 2007 in Lawrence. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author. All mistakes and/or errors are entirely the author's responsibility.

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? 　　　The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. 　　　Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.

Ethnicity and Elections under Authoritarianism: The Case of Kazakhstan

Despite the ethnicisation of power since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has managed to maintain political stability without experiencing large-scale mobilisation to oppose Kazakh domination. This paper examines government strategy to avoid ethnic voting in an attempt to explain why ethnic divisions were rarely reflected in the struggle for power in the republic. While the arbitrary use of legal provisions considerably limited participation in elections by ethnic leaders, powerful pro-president parties that exhibited a cross-ethnic character were created to curtail ethnically based movements. The control strategy in elections aimed not simply at ethnicising the parliament in favour of Kazakhs, but at having loyal Russians and other minorities represented in the legislature through nomination by the president and catch-all pro-regime parties, or through the presidential consultative body—Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. This well-controlled representation of minorities served not only to placate non-Kazakhs but also to provide legitimacy for the Kazakh-dominated leadership by projecting the image of cross-ethnic support for the president and some degree of power-sharing.

A Critical Review of Opinion Polls relating to Iranian Voting Intentions: Problems of Research Methodology as applied to Complex Societies

After the 10th Iranian Presidential election on June 12, 2009, several public opinion polls taken in Iran attracted the attention of policy-makers and journalists around the world because of the political crisis that followed. In this paper I first review critically the polls conducted by the WPO (WorldPublicOpinion.org), PIPA (Program on International Policy Attitudes) at the University of Maryland. I also review an essay by Steven Kull, which is based on the aforementioned poll results and which in my opinion leads to false conclusions concerning Iran’s political prospects. I also discuss “An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public,” published by WPO-PIPA on February 3 2010. The present paper arrives at the overall conclusion that it is impossible to obtain an accurate image of political opinions in societies as complicated as that of Iran by concentrating on only one technique of research and analysis, especially when the political and social situation in the society concerned is in a state of constant flux.

Is the Indonesian President strong or weak?

This paper analyzes the newly institutionalized political system in democratizing Indonesia, with particular reference to the presidential system. Consensus has not yet been reached among scholars on whether the Indonesian president is strong or weak. This paper tries to answer this question by analyzing the legislative and partisan powers of the Indonesian president. It must be acknowledged, however, that these two functions do not on their own explain the strengths and weaknesses of the president. This paper suggests that in order to fully understand the presidential system in Indonesia, we need to take into account not just the president's legislative and partisan powers, but also the legislative process and the characteristics of coalition government.

Kenya's 2007 election crisis

On 27 December 2007, the Republic of Kenya held its tenth general election since independence. The ballot-related proceedings went as planned up to and including the vote count, providing grounds for optimism for a largely peaceful transfer of power. However, after the official declaration by the Electoral Commission of Kenya late in the afternoon of 30 December that the presidential election had been won by the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki (from Central Province and a Kikuyu), Kenya entered into a period of deep crisis. How might we best understand this great turbulence, which was unprecedented in post-independence Kenya? Perhaps the answer lies in the sudden defeat of the opposition's presidential candidate, Raila Odinga from Nyanza Province and a Luo, who had been widely expected to win. With the post-election upheaval as the context, and looking at the situation from the standpoint of political history, this paper will offer an analysis of trends in Kenya's politics since 2002.

Presidentialism and political parties in Indonesia : why are all parties not presidentialized?

This paper analyzes whether the "presidentialization of political parties" is occurring in newly democratizing Indonesia, as argued by Samuels and Shugart (2010). In Indonesia not all parties are becoming presidentialized. Parties are presidentialized when they have a solid organizational structure and have the potential to win presidential elections. Parties established by a presidential candidate need not face an incentive incompatibility between their executive and legislative branches, since the party leader is not the "agent" but the "principal". On the other hand, small and medium-sized parties, which have few prospects of winning presidential elections, are not actively involved in the election process, therefore party organization is not presidentialized. As the local level, where the head of government has been directly elected by the people since 2005 in Indonesia, the presidentialization of political parties has begun to take place.

ロウハーニー大統領の登場から核協議の進展へ -- 米国オバマ政権の対イラン外交の転換と日本

The recent rapprochement between Iran and the United States after Hassan Rouhani was elected president in June 2013 may represent an important geopolitical shift that would alter the politics of the Middle East. The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate this political shift, examine whether the interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States would lead to some structural shifts in the Middle East, and analyze to what extent this change can be sustainable for both sides. The main Part of this paper is divided into three sections. The first section examines in detail the process of Iran's Presidential election in June 2013, especially the sudden change of atmosphere which took place just three days before election day. The second section is devoted to analyzing the Obama administration’s shift to diplomacy with Iran. And the third section treats the on-going nuclear negotiations between Iran and P5+1, which is expected to reach a comprehensive solution. The paper argues that the dramatic shift in the US policy toward Iran is not limited to the bilateral relationships between the US and Iran, but it is related to several key issues in the Middle East, in particular to those in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. This changing process in Iranian politics and the path to diplomacy is profitable for Japanese national interest, and that Japan should also contribute to Iran's return to the international community.

中国と湾岸を結ぶ南アジア -- パキスタン・アフガニスタンの動向と関連させて

Pakistan is geographically situated between China and the Gulf. In order to balance its strategic position against the major security threat of India, Pakistan formed a special and stable strategic alliance with China against common threats since the period of the cold war even though the two countries have neither a political ideology nor political system in common. On the other hand Pakistan established another special relation with Saudi Arabia on the basis of Islamic identity. With its expanding economic capacity, China proposed a project by the name of "new silk road economic corridor" with the intention of expanding and multiplying trade routes with the Middle East and Europe. Within this framework Pakistan is expected to expand the role of an alternative land route that connects the Gulf and China for use if unfavorable emergencies occur in the Malacca route. However, the continuous political uncertainty in Afghanistan after the pullout of US-NATO fighting forces at the end of 2014 and sporadic outbreaks of terrorist acts by Pakistan Taliban in Pakistan have increased China's anxiety regarding Uyghur issues at home. Avoiding military options for the moment, China is trying to find ways to play an active role in the security issues of Afghanistan with help from Pakistan if available. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Pakistani government formed in the general election of 2008 completed its full term and transferred authority to the newly elected government in 2013, something never observed before in Pakistan's history. Coincidently, in Afghanistan the presidential election was carried out peacefully in 2014 in spite of the Taliban threat. Although it is too early to make any definite conclusion, constitutional processes, in spite of their defects, reflected to some extent wishes for normal life of the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan who were disgusted with weak governance and the prevalence of terrorism.

アフリカの「三選問題」 -- ブルンジ、ルワンダ、コンゴ共和国の事例から

ブルンジ、ルワンダ、コンゴ共和国では、いずれも2015年に大統領の三選禁止規定が変更されたが、その影響は大きく異なった。ブルンジでは激しい抗議活動と弾圧によって政治が著しく混乱したのに対し、コンゴでは抗議活動はほぼ封じ込められ、ルワンダでは抗議活動すら起こらなかった。抗議活動の強弱は、反政府勢力の組織力に依存する。ルワンダとコンゴでは、1990年代の内戦に勝利した武装勢力が政権を握り、国内に強力な反政府組織が存在しないうえ、経済的資源の分配を通じて反対派を懐柔できた。一方、国際社会の仲介によって内戦が終結したブルンジでは、権力分有制度のために反政府勢力が強い影響力を保持し、また反対派を懐柔するための資源も乏しかった。「三選問題」が示すのは、民主的な政治制度を採用しつつそれを形骸化させる政権の姿勢だが、それは冷戦後のアフリカで形成された政治秩序の一つの類型でもある。