Investment promotion agencies: do they work?

In this paper, we examine the role of investment promotion agencies (IPAs) in promoting outward FDI from Japan and Korea. Looking at two home countries enables us to control for both country-pair time-invariant characteristics and host country time-varying characteristics. Our empirical results suggest that home-country IPAs tend to be more effective in promoting outward FDI in politically risky host countries. However, this finding depends on whether the home-country firm is listed or unlisted. More specifically, we find that the positive effect of home country IPAs on outward FDI in politically risky countries is limited to unlisted home- country firms, which are widely assumed to be less competitive and productive.

The impact of unstable aids on consumption volatility in developing countries

In recent years, a large and expanding literature has examined the properties of developing economies with regard to the macroeconomic cycle.1 One such property that is characteristic of developing economies is large fluctuations in consumption. Meanwhile, aid for the low income countries is extremely volatile, and under certain circumstances, the volatile aid amplifies the consumption volatility. This document examines whether it is possible that the volatile aid yields high consumption volatility in African countries that constitute the majority of the low income countries. Our numerical analysis reveals that the strongly influential aid disbursements yield a considerably large fluctuation in consumption.

The effects of international politics on oil-exporting developing countries

International politics affects oil trade. But does it affect the oil-exporting developing countries more? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to changes in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI. To the extent that developing countries have higher hold-up risks because of their weaker institutions, the political effect on oil trade should be more significant in the developing world. We find that oil import decisions are indeed more elastic when firms import from developing countries, although the reverse is true in the short run. Our results suggest that international politics can affect oil revenue and hence long-term development in the developing world.