Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

From authoritarianism to upheaval : the political economy of the Syrian uprising and regime persistence

The ensuing bloodshed and deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Syria, the failure of the United Nations Security Council to reach a consensus on what action to take, and the involvement of contending external actors partially reflect the complexity of the current impasse. Despite the importance of regional and international factors, however, this papers attempts to argue that the domestic dynamics of the Syrian crisis have been vitally important in determining the course of the popular uprising and the regime’s response. In this, Syria’s crisis belongs with the Arab Spring the trajectories and prospects of which have been shaped by dynamics within regimes. It will be seen that the formal and informal institutional structure of the Ba‘thist regime in Syria has been critical to its resilience and ability to stay united so far while attempting to crush a peaceful popular uprising that turned into insurgency in the face of the regime’s violent crackdown.

Cuba's social policy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union -- social development as legitimacy of regime and its economy effectiveness

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cuba has experienced a severe economic crisis, and the country's social policy has played an important role in showing the people a raison-d'etre for the revolution. This role has become even stronger in recent years, as internal and external actors demand political reforms and economic liberalization. This article first examines the Cuban government's use of social development to counter the demands for changes. It then looks at the extent that government social policy contributes economically to improving the Cuban living standard. The article demonstrates empirically how the leadership emphasizes their social accomplishments whenever demands for change come, and then shows that after the suspension of Soviet aid, Cuban social policy has been able to provide services mainly by relying on human capital and reducing quality materially because of the shortage of foreign reserves. This has limited the economic effectiveness of the services.

Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan: The Political Economy of Bad-Loan Creation

This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? 　　　The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. 　　　Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.

Regime survival strategies and the conduct of foreign policy in Egypt

エジプトではムバーラク大統領の国内政策と域内におけるエジプトの影響力低迷が引き金となって、2011年1月25日に抗議運動起こった。抗議運動はエジプト全土に拡がり、18日間の民衆的な反体制運動によってムバーラクは軍に見捨てられ、失脚に追い込まれた。この民衆蜂起によって警察は街頭から撤退し、シナイ半島の警察署は焼き放たれ、ムバーラクが率いていた国民民主党の建物や国内治安機関の本部は襲撃され、国家機関が数ヶ月にもわたって機能不全となり、ムバーラク体制の崩壊は国内的な混乱を招くこととなった。振り返れば、エジプトでの政治的大変動は社会的な革命へと展開することはできなかった。その理由は独裁体制からの移行を先導できる組織化された反体制勢力が存在しなかったためである。民衆による抗議運動は一時的に体制を転覆できても旧体制のエリートを分裂させることはできず、軍の影響下にある体制の復活を防ぐこともできなかった。2011年以降のエジプトは現在まで混乱状態に陥ったままであるが、1カ月に及ぶエジプト軍最高評議会(SCAF)の暫定統治、エジプト史上初の自由な大統領選挙によって選出された文民大統領のムルスィーによる一年余りの統治、そして2013年7月の軍事クーデターによって権力の座に就いたスィースィーの統治といった過程で、民衆蜂起がエジプトの外交関係に及ぼした影響はごく僅かであった。本稿は、現在のエジプトの外交政策が2011年の革命にほとんど影響を受けていないのはなぜか、またエジプトの統治者たちが政権の正統性、体制の強化および政治的な安定性を確保し、国内的な課題に対処するための戦略をいかに策定しているのかを説明することを試みる。本稿での主張は、ムバーラク以降のエジプトが体制の強化と保全のために外交政策を進めており、国内的な混乱によって地域内アクターへの依存度が高まっていることである。