The Experience of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) : Political Parties in Kenya from 1991 to 2007

This paper first examines splits and mergers among Kenya’s political parties (and inner-party factions) from the restoration of a multi-party system in 1991 until 2007, before the turbulent 10th general elections were conducted. It then considers what functions “political parties” have in Kenya with special reference to the period since 2002, the year in which President Moi announced his intention to retire. A look back at NARC’s five years of rule reveals that, although it succeeded in changing the government, NARC, as a “political party,” remained throughout an organization without any real substance. The paper looks at (1) NARC’s de facto split after its overwhelming win in the ninth general election, (2) malfunctions of the anti-defection laws that were introduced in the 1960s, and (3) Kenya’s election rules that require candidates to be nominated by registered political parties in general elections. The paper proceeds to argue that as a result of the operation of these three elements, Kenya’s political parties, and especially the victorious coalition sides, tend to end up being nothing more than temporary vehicles for political elites angling for post-election posts.

Presidentialism and political parties in Indonesia : why are all parties not presidentialized?

This paper analyzes whether the "presidentialization of political parties" is occurring in newly democratizing Indonesia, as argued by Samuels and Shugart (2010). In Indonesia not all parties are becoming presidentialized. Parties are presidentialized when they have a solid organizational structure and have the potential to win presidential elections. Parties established by a presidential candidate need not face an incentive incompatibility between their executive and legislative branches, since the party leader is not the "agent" but the "principal". On the other hand, small and medium-sized parties, which have few prospects of winning presidential elections, are not actively involved in the election process, therefore party organization is not presidentialized. As the local level, where the head of government has been directly elected by the people since 2005 in Indonesia, the presidentialization of political parties has begun to take place.

The misconception of political lessons : how UMNO perceives the fall of LDP in Japan

2012 marks the thirtieth anniversary of Malaysia’s Look East Policy (LEP). This article argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is stimulated by symbiotic ties binding together both countries’ respective major political parties, viz. the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), derived political lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. Two forms of lessons may be discerned. First, emulation of Japan’s success in economic development, which become the basis of LEP launched in 1981. Second, on which our article focuses, lessons from the failure of LDP to retain power twice in 1993 and 2009. Since 1993, DP’s defeat has been a poignant reminder for UMNO to be in alert mode in facing any electoral possibility. When LDP was again ousted from power in 2009, UMNO was a most psychologically affected party owing to the unprecedented setback it suffered at Malaysia’s Twelfth General Elections (GE) of 2008. Yet, although LDP’s reversal of fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1999, the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogising between different situations which at a glance seem to be comparable.

Social cleavages and electoral support in Turkey -- toward convergence?

Studies on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages stabilize the electoral behavior and thus reduce electoral volatility. But how do social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, such as in Turkey? In this study, investigations were carried out on long- and short-term relationships between social cleavages (religiosity, ethnicity, and sectarism) and electoral volatility in Turkey during the 1961-2002 period. Cross-sectional multiple regressions were applied to electoral and demographic data at the provincial level. The results showed that in the long-term, social cleavages on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. Repeated elections have mitigated the volatile effect of social cleavages on the voting behavior, as political parties have become more representative of the existent social cleavages.

The Sandinista Revolution and Post-Conflict Development--Key Issues

Following Daniel Ortega's victory in the presidential election held in November 2006, Nicaragua has been undergoing a transition from a democratic to authoritarian system. In the 1980s, Ortega served as President of the Sandinista government and implemented a Cuban-type socialist system, but the system failed and democracy was established during 1990-2007. Considering this failure, why did Ortega succeed in taking power again? This paper provides a brief history of modern Nicaragua and gives some insights into the twists of Latin American politics. The paper was prepared for the international seminar on Helping Failed States Recover: The Role of Business in Promoting Stability and Development, organized by the University of Kansas Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER), held on April 4-6, 2007 in Lawrence. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author. All mistakes and/or errors are entirely the author's responsibility.

Constitutional Review and Democratic Consolidation: A Literature Review

This paper reviews the literature on the prevalence of constitutional review across the world, and particularly in emerging democracies, during the last two decades. Two major questions should be addressed in this regard. First, why has the judiciary been empowered and what factors affect judicial activism? Second, does constitutional review ensure an effective self-enforcing function? In sum, the literature shows that constitutional review can make democracy self-enforcing if there is sufficient competition among political parties or between the legislature and the executive branch of government. In a more sophisticated case, political balance within the court can also ensure the observance of court decisions.

Non-economic voting and incumbent strength in Turkey

Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and demonstrates that even among Turkey's long-lasting governments, the AKP has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic performance.

「アラブの春」後の移行期過程 -- 帰結を分ける諸要因

Diverging outcomes are unfolding in the post-Arab Uprising countries' transitional processes. In January 2014, Tunisia successfully adopted a new constitution based on a consensus of the opposing political parties and factions. In contrast, Egypt abolished one constitution and hastily instituted another in a time span of slightly more than a year. Yemen has announced the final document of the National Dialogue Conference in the same month. Libyans finally voted for the long awaited and disputed elections of the Constitutional Drafting Committee in February 2014. The paper picks up three factors which seem to be influential in determining the modality of transitional political process in the four Post-Arab spring countries. The first is the initial conditions of the transitional politics.. Differences in the way the previous regimes collapsed are analyzed to illuminate the continuity and break of the ruling institutions and state apparatus. The second factor is the type of the interim government. In line with Shain and Linz typology, provisional, power-sharing, caretaker, and international interim government models are applied to clarify the types of interim governments in each four countries' different phases in transitional politics. The third is the "rules of the game," particularly those pertaining to the constitutional process. Who set what kind of rules and how are to be considered in each of four countries and possible influences of each set of the rules of the game to the diverging results of the transitional politics are considered.

Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 : religious cleavage or economic performance?

In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties' share of the vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular parties' vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet available.

トルコにおける2015年総選挙とエルドアン体制の政策変容

In Turkey, the political system in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan plays the most important role – the "Erdoğan regime" – has been in place since November 2002. After Erdoğan’s party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), won the general elections and he became the prime minster, they were successful in maintaining the single-party administration over ten years. Even since becoming the president and devolving the premiership to Ahmet Davutoğlu in August 2014, Erdoğan has been at the center of the Turkish parliamentary system. However, in the Turkish general elections in June 2015, the AKP failed to get a majority of parliamentary seats for the first time, and the Erdoğan regime seemed to be faced with a crisis. The regime was able to regain the single-party administration in the early general elections in November 2015 by carrying out significant political change after their first electoral defeat. In this sense, for Turkey and the Erdoğan regime, the year 2015 was not only the year of the election, but also of political change. This paper analyzes these two general elections in 2015 and the changes of the political tendencies of the Erdoğan regime which have been observed since the general elections in June 2015 in particular. It also focuses on the changes in the strategies and the relationships among Turkish political actors including President Erdoğan, the AKP government, and the other major political parties.