How does contract design affect the uptake of microcredit among the ultra-poor? : experimental evidence from the river islands of Northern Bangladesh

Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of dwellers could be categorized as ultra-poor due to cyclic floods. We randomly offered four types of loans to such dwellers: regular small cash loans with one-year maturity, large cash loans with three-year maturity both with and without a one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock loans with three-year maturity and a one-year grace period. We compared uptake rates as well as the determinants of uptake and found that the uptake rate is the lowest for the regular contract, followed by the in-kind contract. Contrary to prior belief, we also found that the microcredit demand by the ultra-poor is not necessarily small, and in particular the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join a microcredit program than the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to a large amount of credit, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind. This paper provides evidence that a typical microcredit contract with one-year maturity and without a grace period is not attractive to the ultra-poor. Microfinance institutions may need to design better credit contracts to address the poor's needs.

Impact of seasonality-adjusted flexible microcredit on repayment and food consumption : experimental evidence from rural Bangladesh

The mismatch between credit repayments and income seasonality poses a challenge for microfinance institutions (MFIs) working in developing countries. For instance, in northern Bangladesh, income and consumption downfalls during the lean season after the transplanting of major paddy crops are a serious threat to a household's economy. Poor landless agricultural wage laborers suffer the most owing to this seasonality as they face difficulties in smoothing their consumption. However, in designing microcredit products, MFIs do not usually provide flexibility or seasonal adjustment during the lean season. This is mainly because MFIs are afraid that such flexibility might break the repayment discipline of borrowers, resulting in higher default rates. We thus conducted a randomized controlled trial in 2011-12 in northern Bangladesh to empirically test whether seasonality-adjusted flexible microcredit leads to an increase in repayment problems for MFIs as well as whether it can increase and stabilize consumption of borrower households. Our results suggest no statistically discernible difference among the treatment arms in case of default, overdue amount, or repayment frequency. On the other hand, we find no positive impact of repayment flexibility on immediate food consumption during the period of seasonality, except for in-kind full moratorium treatment group. After a year of initial intervention, however, we see positive changes in food intake during the lean season. Thus, our preliminary results are in favor of seasonality-adjusted flexible microcredit.